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ABSTRACT 
Systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) is a relatively rare autoimmune disease with 
no known aetiology or cure. In addition to numerous physical symptoms, those 
living with SLE have also been shown to experience significant emotional and 
psychosocial difficulties. There has been little psychological research into SLE 
despite the rapidly increasing interest in health psychology and quality of life 
issues over the last two decades. One such issue that has commanded particular 
attention is that of cognitive bias in individuals with chronic pain and/or chronic 
illness. Cognitive bias toward illness-related information is theorised to indicate 
the presence of an illness self-schema, and is a valuable tool of investigation as it 
permits access to a level of cognitive structure that is inaccessible via self-report 
instruments.  
 
The primary focus of the present study is to investigate recall bias for pain- and 
illness-related words in SLE patients. This bias is explored relative to the recall of 
neutral words and depression-related words, and also relative to the responses of 
rheumatoid arthritis (RA) patients and healthy controls. Two hypotheses are 
proposed: firstly, that bias is related to disease activity; and secondly, that bias is 
related to the combination of illness and depression. 
 
The findings provide support for the second hypothesis, with the additional caveat 
that the nature of the pain/illness stimuli used is important in determining the 
presence of cognitive bias. No recall bias for illness-related words as a whole was 
found in any of the groups, nor was there evidence of a recall bias in the SLE and 
RA patients when they were divided according to depression status. However, 
when the illness words were examined separately according to “sensory pain” and 
“disability-related” words, a clear bias for disability words was found in the 
depressed patient group. It is concluded that there is a relationship between 
 
 
 
 
 
7
depression in chronically ill individuals, and the way in which such individuals 
process disability-related words. In accordance with the schema-enmeshment 
model (Pincus & Morley, 2001), it is suggested that both a pain-schema and an 
illness-schema exist, and it is when these two schemas become enmeshed with the 
self-schema that depression occurs in chronic pain/chronically ill patients.  
 
The cognitive bias assessment paradigm adopted in this study-one that is typically 
used in similar investigations-is lengthy, requires sophisticated equipment and can 
be difficult to interpret on an individual level. The present study investigates the 
relationship between cognitive biases in SLE patients and a recently-developed 
task, PRISM, which appears to symbolise the enmeshment of illness-, pain- and 
self-schemas. Analyses confirmed that recall of negative illness words was the 
only independent predictor of PRISM scores. This suggests that PRISM, a quick 
and easy task to administer, may have considerable usefulness as a clinical tool to 
assess information relevant to the enmeshment of illness- and self-schema. A 
greater understanding of schema and the processing styles of chronically ill 
patients will allow for more effective psychological treatment such that quality of 
life can be improved. 
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1. SYSTEMIC LUPUS ERYTHEMATOSUS 
1a. Introduction 
Systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) is a chronic autoimmune disease with no 
known aetiology or cure. SLE typically affects multiple organ systems such that 
they become inflamed and sometimes damaged. Common symptoms include 
extreme fatigue, arthritis, fever, anaemia, pleurisy, facial skin rash and hair loss. 
SLE is potentially life-threatening when it affects essential organs such as the 
heart, central nervous system or kidneys (McCracken et al, 1995).  
 
SLE is rare, with prevalence rates in Caucasian populations estimated at between 
12 and 50 per 100 000, but in non-Caucasian populations the prevalence rate is 
three times as high. Non-Caucasian race is also a risk factor for death from SLE 
(Wallace, 1995). SLE is far more common in females, occurring eight times more 
often in women than in men (McAlindon, 2000). 
 
The disease tends to follow an unpredictable and chronic course with alternating 
exacerbations (flares) and remissions of symptoms (Segui et al, 2000). Typically, 
remissions refer to a reduction in symptoms such that the person is able to live a 
relatively normal lifestyle. Symptoms can range from mild to severe from person 
to person, or from flare to flare within the same person. New symptoms may 
continue to appear years after the initial diagnosis (National Institute of Health 
(NIH), 2001). Diagnosis is often difficult, as many of the symptoms of SLE are 
similar to those of other illnesses. To complicate diagnosis further, symptoms are 
often not present concurrently, with different symptoms presenting at different 
times during the illness. Newly diagnosed patients have been experiencing 
symptoms such as extreme fatigue, weakness and frequent infections for an 
average of three years (Wallace, 1995). Treatments for partial relief of the 
1. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus 
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symptoms of SLE include corticosteroids and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory 
medications, as well as immunosuppressant medication (NIH, 2001). However, 
none of these treatments are able to provide a cure for the illness and are more 
aimed at preventing the development of different symptoms. 
 
 
1b. Neuropsychiatric Manifestations of SLE 
"Neuropsychiatric" is a collective term for both the neurological and psychiatric 
problems known to be associated with SLE. Such problems can indicate that there 
is central nervous system (CNS) involvement. That is, just as SLE can manifest in 
inflammation of the kidneys or lungs, it can also result in inflammation of various 
parts of the brain. Common neuropsychiatric sequelae range from overt 
manifestations such as seizure disorders, strokes, psychosis and mood disorders, to 
headaches or subtle abnormalities in cognitive functioning (Hanly & Liang, 1997; 
Iverson, 1995).  
 
The neuropsychiatric manifestation of SLE has been the focus of the largest 
amount of psychological research in the SLE field, however, still relatively little is 
known about the frequency of neuropsychiatric presentations and the underlying 
mechanisms that account for their development. Estimations of frequency vary 
from 14 to 75 percent (Hanly & Liang, 1997). These discrepancies in estimated 
prevalence are likely to be due to methodological differences in patient selection, 
classification and definition, and attribution of cause (Kozora et al, 1996). Some 
studies, for example, classify depression as a neuropsychiatric manifestation of 
SLE, whilst other studies do not, considering depression to be an understandable 
psychological reaction to a potentially debilitating illness. To complicate matters 
further, corticosteroid medication (a standard treatment for SLE) is known to 
provoke disturbances in mood and cognition in some patients (Alpay & Cassem, 
1. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus 
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2000). Thus, considerable controversy exists as to the extent and aetiology of the 
numerous neuropsychiatric manifestations of SLE. It is often difficult to 
differentiate the primary symptoms of disease from the psychological 
consequences of living with a chronic illness. Of the neuropsychiatric 
manifestations, there are two areas of particular interest to the psychological 
functioning of patients with SLE: cognitive dysfunction and psychiatric morbidity. 
 
 
1b i) Cognitive Dysfunction 
The most common of the neurological complications found in SLE is cognitive 
dysfunction (Ainiala et al, 2001; Grant et al, 1997). Once again, the estimated 
prevalence varies widely from study to study (12 to 87 percent) (Harrison & 
Ravdin, 2002). However, suffice to say that in all studies a sizeable proportion of 
SLE patients demonstrate cognitive problems. Deficits are most frequently 
observed in the areas of memory, simple attention, visuospatial processing and 
psychomotor speed (Ainiala et al, 2001).  
 
Cognitive problems are more common in SLE patients with prior or current overt 
neuropsychiatric (CNS) involvement, but have also been found to occur in patients 
without overt CNS involvement at a higher rate than that found in healthy controls 
(Monastero et al, 2001; Denburg et al, 1997). In an attempt to delineate the 
relationship between these factors, Kozora and colleagues (1996) compared the 
cognitive and psychological functioning of SLE patients with no known CNS 
involvement with that of rheumatoid arthritis (RA) patients and healthy controls. 
One-third of the SLE patients were found to have cognitive abnormalities, 
indicating that overt CNS disease involvement is not the only cause of cognitive 
deficits in SLE. However, a similar incidence (31%) of cognitive impairment was 
found in the RA group. RA is an autoimmune disease causing joint inflammation, 
1. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus 
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but is not typically associated with CNS involvement. These findings suggest that 
the mechanisms underlying the cognitive deficits may not be specific to SLE, but 
rather may be associated with typical chronic illness symptoms such as pain, 
fatigue, mood disturbance and medication effects. All of these factors are known to 
affect cognitive processing. However, one marked difference between the two 
patient groups was in learning efficiency. SLE patients exhibited significantly 
more difficulty in encoding novel material than did the RA patients. It is 
conceivable that an SLE-specific process may mediate this aspect of cognitive 
dysfunction.  
 
Research to date has demonstrated that cognitive impairment is common in SLE, 
but more research is required in order to identify the underlying mechanisms. 
  
 
1b ii) Psychiatric Morbidity 
Point prevalence of psychiatric disorders in SLE is estimated to be approximately 
20%, although some studies have found prevalence rates to be as high as 70% 
(Hugo et al, 1996; Hay et al, 1994; Wekking, 1993). An accurate estimate of the 
occurrence of psychiatric disorders is complicated by methodological differences 
between studies. Studies relying on questionnaire assessments typically 
overestimate the occurrence of depression, due to the preponderance of somatic 
items that are influenced by current physical symptomatology (such as aches or 
fatigue). Moreover, some of the documented psychiatric morbidity can be 
attributed to a primary manifestation of neuropsychiatric involvement (such as 
psychosis). Nonetheless, a considerable number of psychiatric disorders cannot be 
explained by a direct expression of the disease (such as depression in non-CNS 
SLE patients) and more likely reflect psychological consequences of living with a 
chronic illness (Denburg et al, 1997; Kozora et al, 1996).  
1. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus 
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1c. Psychosocial Difficulties Associated with SLE 
In addition to the psychiatric morbidity typically attributed to CNS involvement, a 
growing body of evidence indicates that SLE is associated with a number of 
psychological and emotional difficulties. In a study of nearly 400 Australian 
women with SLE, the most commonly reported problems included depressed 
mood, stress and changes in body image (Bauman et al, 1990). Iverson (1995) 
reported that SLE is associated with psychological problems including depression, 
low self-esteem, sleep disturbance, fear of death, emotional lability and marital 
discord. Indeed, a recent study comparing cancer patients and SLE patients found 
that cancer patients were less demoralised, less emotionally distressed, in less pain, 
and reported more benefit-finding associated with their illness (Katz et al, 2001). 
These data indicate that it is often difficult to cope with living with SLE, such that 
it frequently has emotional consequences that can lead to high levels of distress. 
 
Whilst some research has been conducted into the psychological factors associated 
with SLE, the area remains relatively unexplored when compared with such 
research in other chronic illness populations. Rheumatoid arthritis (RA), for 
example, is an autoimmune disease that is similar to SLE in its mechanisms, 
symptoms and treatment. Presumably because it is more common (occurring in 
approximately 1% of the population), RA has commanded considerable attention 
in both the medical and psychological literature. A consistent finding has been that 
RA patients exhibit a higher rate of depression than the general population (Alpay 
& Cassem, 2000; Katz & Yelin, 1993; Creed, 1990). Other findings include the 
importance of active coping strategies, social support, realistic disease 
interpretations and self-efficacy in minimising impairment and disability (see 
Young, 1992 for a review). 
 
1. Systemic Lupus Erythematosus 
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Whilst patients with RA have been shown to experience considerably more 
psychological distress than healthy controls, evidence suggests that the level of 
distress is at least as high or higher in SLE patients. Burckhardt and colleagues 
(1993) found that SLE and RA patients reported similar levels of psychosocial 
impact of disease and perceived health status. Non-CNS SLE patients were found 
to experience greater emotional and psychological distress (42%) than RA patients 
(7%) or controls (6%) (Kozora et al, 1996). Wekking and colleagues (1991) found 
that the number and intensity of daily stressors were more strongly related to 
physical well-being in SLE than in RA.  
 
Considering the pain and lifestyle limitations that RA and SLE impose on patients, 
it is not surprising that depression rates are elevated. In many ways it makes 
intuitive sense that the chronically ill with particularly severe pain and discomfort 
will be the most depressed. Indeed, it has been assumed that disease severity plays 
the most significant role in patients’ emotional distress. However, over the last two 
decades the evidence from the “quality of life” literature has challenged this 
assumption. 
 
 
2. Psychological Factors & Chronic Illness 
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2. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS & CHRONIC ILLNESS 
2a. Quality of Life in Chronic Illness 
“Quality of life” has become a very popular concept in both the medical and 
psychological literature in recent years (Wood-Dauphinee, 1999). Although there 
is contention over its specific definition, quality of life (QOL) broadly refers to the 
patient’s subjective account of his/her health, incorporating variables such as 
physical mobility, emotional well-being, social life, and overall well-being 
(Jenkinson et al, 1993). Whilst laboratory and clinical indicators of disease were 
once considered to provide a complete picture of health status, health professionals 
are now conceding that the patient’s perspective is also of substantial significance 
(Wood-Dauphinee, 1999). This shift has been necessitated by the growing body of 
evidence indicating that QOL and disease variables often have little or no 
association with one another (Persson & Sahlberg, 2002; Stoll et al, 2001; Wang et 
al, 2001; Gladman et al, 1996). That is, a more severe disease process does not 
necessarily imply a poorer QOL. It follows then, that improving physical 
symptoms through medical treatment should not be the only consideration when 
dealing with chronically ill patients, as this may not necessarily improve a patient’s 
QOL (Muldoon et al, 1998). A greater understanding of the psychosocial factors 
contributing to the way in which people endure chronic illness is therefore of great 
importance in determining how to best improve QOL. 
 
 
2b. Psychological Factors & the Disease Process 
Investigation into the psychological factors associated with chronic illness is not 
only important in terms of alleviating the distress experienced by these patients: 
the evidence indicates that psychological processes and emotional states can 
actually influence the progression of disease. In reviewing the literature in RA, for 
2. Psychological Factors & Chronic Illness 
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example, Young (1992) found that psychological measures have been shown to be 
more important determinants of disability than have disease variables. In 
particular, catastrophising has been convincingly shown to influence pain 
experiences. The tendency to magnify or exaggerate the threat value or seriousness 
of pain is associated with an increase in disability, pain behaviour and use of 
analgesic medication (Sullivan et al, 2001). 
 
In the SLE literature, a finding of particular interest indicates that SLE patients 
differ from healthy controls in their immunological response to acute 
psychological stress (Pawlak et al, 1999). Anecdotal evidence supporting this 
finding is the clinical observation that stress often precedes an increase in disease 
activity in SLE patients. Da Costa and colleagues (1999) found that the major 
short-term determinants of functional disability in SLE patients were not 
demographic- or disease-related factors, but rather stress associated with negative 
life events. There is considerable evidence demonstrating that there is a link 
between the way people think, feel and behave, and how well they tend to 
withstand illness and poor health (Turk & Okifuli, 2002; Baum & Posluszny, 
1999; Compas et al, 1998). Thus, investigation of attitudes and behaviours should 
lead not only to an improvement in the emotional well-being of patients, but also 
in their physical well-being. 
 
 
2c. Attitudes & Illness 
Evidence indicates that some patients have significantly higher rates of distress 
than others with the same chronic illness and the same severity of symptoms. But 
what is the origin of these inflated rates of distress? In SLE, it cannot be fully 
explained by disease severity or CNS involvement, so another factor must 
contribute to the high levels of distress observed. Self-regulation theory suggests 
2. Psychological Factors & Chronic Illness 
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that attitudes towards illness are one important determinant of emotional 
adjustment to illness (Leventhal et al, 1984; Nerenz & Leventhal, 1983). That is, 
the way in which someone perceives his or her illness will affect the way in which 
he or she copes with that illness, which will in turn affect the level of 
psychological distress experienced. The self-regulation model proposes that a 
patient’s representation of his or her illness has five primary components - identity, 
cause, time-line, consequences and cure - as depicted in Table 1 below. These 
components are proposed to reflect a patient’s cognitive response to symptoms and 
illness, whilst emotional responses are processed in parallel. The components are 
not necessarily independent factors, but rather are likely to be inter-related. 
 
Table 1: The five components of illness representation according to self-regulation theory.  
 
Component Relates to: 
Identity the nature and symptoms of one’s illness 
Cause the patient’s beliefs about the likely cause(s) of the condition 
Time-line perceptions regarding the likely duration and pattern of illness 
Consequences beliefs regarding illness severity and likely impact on 
functioning 
Cure extent to which the patient considers the illness to be amenable 
to cure or control 
Adapted from Nerenz & Leventhal (1983) 
 
Evidence supporting this model has been found in numerous patient populations, 
including RA. Smith and colleagues (1988) demonstrated that RA patients who 
displayed negative or exaggerated interpretations of their illness (that is, perceived 
excessively negative consequences) were significantly more depressed and 
disabled than were patients whose interpretations were less extreme. A similar 
2. Psychological Factors & Chronic Illness 
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finding indicated that pain in RA patients is as equally and independently predicted 
by negative illness cognitions as it is by impairment (Persson & Sahlberg, 2002). 
In a recent prospective study, Sharpe, Sensky & Allard (2001) found that beliefs 
about the consequences of arthritis predicted depression in recent-onset RA 
patients over a 21-month period. 
 
The primary method by which illness attitudes have been explored is self-report 
measures. Indeed, a questionnaire has been developed (based on the illness 
representation components outlined in self-regulation theory) to specifically 
measure illness perceptions (the Illness Perception Questionnaire; IPQ) (Weinman 
et al, 1996). Questionnaire measures are useful in that they assess the content of 
one’s beliefs, and provide information as to the degree that individuals endorse (in 
a strategic manner) certain statements as applying to their situation. However a 
disadvantage of using questionnaires is that they cannot test the proposition that 
cognitive representations (or sets of beliefs) of illness affect the way in which 
future information (for example, symptoms of illness) is processed and understood. 
Such a proposition has been put forward in the literature pertaining to self-schemas 
and cognitive bias.  
 
 
3. Self-Schemas 
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3. SELF-SCHEMAS 
Markus (1977) was one of the first to articulate and test out the hypothesised 
construct of self-schemas. She defined self-schemas as "cognitive generalisations 
about the self, derived from past experience, that organise and guide the processing 
of self-related information contained in the individual's social experiences" 
(Markus, 1977; p64). Self-schemas represent the way in which the self has been 
articulated and differentiated in memory, and have properties relating to both 
content and function. The content of the structure is a list of general and specific 
terms characteristic of the individual that have been derived from a lifetime of 
experience with personal data. The content of self-schemas is typically assessed 
through questionnaires that ask patients to endorse beliefs about themselves. The 
self-schema functions to organise the processing and retention of self-related 
information (Derry & Kuiper, 1981). That is, self-schemas determine the 
importance given to experiences and the subsequent interpretation and processing 
of those experiences. Individuals will be more attentive to, and take ownership of, 
experiences that are deemed to be self-relevant; that is, consistent with their self-
schema (Wiginton, 1999; Rojahn & Pettigrew, 1992).  
 
As mentioned earlier, beliefs have been typically assessed via questionnaires. In 
the self-schema model, questionnaires assess the schema content. Yet they cannot 
assess the automatic processing resulting from the presence of schema (schema 
function). Assessment of this schema aspect necessitates tasks that require the 
individual to process information automatically. These cognitive processing tasks 
(discussed in detail below) complement the questionnaire method, as they each 
assess different aspects of self-schemas. 
 
Each person is thought to possess a number of self-schemas pertaining to various 
3. Self-Schemas 
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content domains. That is, from each individual's unique experiences, one develops 
cognitive generalisations about oneself with regard to many aspects of life. For 
example, researchers have identified self-schemas in the domains of depression, 
Type A behaviour, age, gender, and one’s body (Schwoebel et al, 2001; Clemmey 
& Nicassio, 1997; Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Beck, 1976).  
 
It is hypothesised, given the nature of self-schemas and the likely existence of 
domain-specific schemas, that an illness self-schema also exists. Self-regulation 
theory’s illness representation that was described earlier is almost identical to what 
we understand an illness self-schema to be. The patient is described as actively 
constructing a representation of his or her illness from current illness episodes, 
memories of prior experiences of illness, and lay understandings of illness (Nerenz 
& Leventhal, 1983). This representation is described as directing and regulating 
action, in particular, coping responses. The illness representation is described as 
flexible and changeable, depending on the nature of current situational stimuli. 
Self-regulation theory postulates that patients who have been labelled chronically 
ill will search their present and past concrete experiences for validating signs or 
symptoms, due to their cognitive representations of chronic illness.   
 
 
 
3a. Identifying & Measuring Self-Schemas: 
Cognitive Bias 
Attempts to investigate the effects (functions) of self-schemas has largely focused 
on the area of information processing and the presence of cognitive biases towards 
relevant information. Such a focus makes intuitive sense, as the inevitable 
consequence of a structure that functions to organise and process information is to 
bias and distort information (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997). Calfas and colleagues 
3. Self-Schemas 
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(1997) state that: 
  
“Individuals will process most thoroughly, and hence later recall, information that is consistent 
with their active self-referent cognitive structures…..Recall patterns thus allow inferences 
as to the presence, composition and/or operation of cognitive structures.” (p577) 
 
Studies have demonstrated this, in that the existence of self-schemas in a given 
content domain affects the processing of information consistent with that domain. 
Most commonly, studies have investigated either selective attention (using the 
Stroop task or the dot probe task) (Grisart & Plaghki, 1999; Riemann & McNally, 
1995), or memory bias (Pauli & Alpers, 2002; Koutantji et al, 1999; Edwards et al, 
1992; Bradley & Mathews, 1988). Differential response times to schema-
consistent stimuli relative to schema-inconsistent stimuli have also been 
investigated (Koutantji et al, 2000).  
 
 
3a i) Cognitive Bias in Psychological Disorders 
Much of the early research into cognitive bias was conducted in the area of 
psychological disorders, primarily depression and anxiety. Patients suffering from 
a variety of anxiety disorders (such as obsessive compulsive disorder or specific 
phobias) have been shown to selectively attend to, and recall more of, stimuli 
related to their fears (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams et al, 1996). Cognitive bias 
in this population has become a well-established phenomenon. Although not as 
robustly as in anxious patients, cognitive bias has also been demonstrated in 
depressed populations (for a review, see Mathews, 1997). An investigation by 
Bradley & Mathews (1988) is representative of a typical study in this area. They 
examined the memory biases of depressed patients, and found that depressed 
patients exhibited a bias for negative material (words such as ‘ashamed’ or 
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‘miserable’), whilst controls recalled more positive material (words such as 
‘talented’ or ‘delighted’). As has been demonstrated in numerous other studies (for 
example, Pincus et al, 1993), the recall bias for self-referent material was 
significantly greater than that for other-referent stimuli. This is consistent with a 
self-schema model, in that information directly related to the self and consistent 
with core beliefs is more readily processed (Koutantji et al, 1999). 
 
3a ii) Cognitive Bias in Chronic Pain & Chronic Illness 
It is only in the last decade and a half that the information processing paradigm has 
been extended to pain populations. If anxious patients selectively process anxious 
material, and depressed patients selectively process negative material, then perhaps 
pain patients selectively process pain material. Research to date regarding 
cognitive bias for pain-related stimuli in pain patients has been somewhat 
inconsistent (see Pincus & Morley, 2001 for a comprehensive review). 
 
One important reason why the literature may be inconsistent is the differing 
definitions of “pain” and “chronic pain”. The International Association for the 
Study of Pain (IASP) defines pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms 
of such damage” (IASP Sub Committee on Taxonomy, 1979; p250). This 
definition of pain is widely used, however the definition of chronic pain is more 
contentious. Chronic pain in its strict sense refers to physical pain that has been 
ongoing for a number of months for which physical explanations do not fully 
account for the reported severity (Birket-Smith, 2001). Typically, this refers to 
individuals who have sustained an injury (for example, to their lower back), and 
the pain has continued despite the overt injury itself having healed. This definition 
is not consistently applied in the chronic pain and cognitive bias literature, where 
“chronic pain” can refer to either this situation, or (for example) to patients who 
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suffer pain chronically as a direct result of a chronic illness (for example, arthritis). 
This issue in and of itself has been the subject of much research and debate, and 
therefore falls beyond the scope and aim of the present study. Suffice to say that 
we consider this distinction to important, as the process through which individuals 
experience pain and illness is different (Dersch et al, 2002). For clarity, in the 
present study we will use the term “chronic pain” in its strict sense unless 
otherwise stated.  
 
Attention Bias 
One of the first studies to demonstrate pain bias was conducted by Pearce & 
Morley (1989). Using a modified Stroop task, they found that chronic pain patients 
were slower to name the colours of sensory pain words (for example, ‘throbbing’ 
or ‘stabbing’) and affective pain words (for example, ‘sickening’ or ‘unbearable’) 
compared to neutral words. This attention bias was not mediated by mood, and no 
such bias was observed in pain-free subjects. In the only study to replicate this 
attention bias for all pain stimuli in chronic pain patients as a whole, Snider and 
colleagues (2000) only found a bias after controlling for depression. Other studies 
have failed to find an overall bias towards pain-related material in pain 
populations, and have only found attention biases in subgroups of pain patients 
divided according to depression, anxiety and fear of pain (Crombez et al, 2000; 
Pincus et al, 1998; Asmundson et al, 1997; Dehghani et al, submitted), or more 
specific biases according to the type of pain stimuli used (Crombez et al, 2000; 
Dehghani et al, submitted). 
 
Recall Bias 
Similar complexities and apparent inconsistencies have been found in the memory 
bias literature. Pearce and colleagues (1990) demonstrated memory bias for 
sensory pain words in chronic pain patients relative to pain-free controls, however 
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there are a number of reasons why this study cannot be easily compared to 
subsequent studies. Participants were warned of the recall task prior to encoding 
the words (intentional memory), which is in contrast to the incidental memory 
paradigm employed in other studies. Hence, this task was unlikely to have 
represented an automatic level of processing because it required individuals to 
purposefully attempt to recall information at a strategic level. The mechanisms of 
strategic versus automatic processing are argued to be different (Watkins et al, 
2000; Richardson-Klavehn & Gardiner, 1998; Fastenau et al, 1997), and it is 
incidental memory that has traditionally been utilised to reflect cognitive bias at an 
automatic level of processing (Pincus & Morley, 2001). In addition, in Pearce and 
colleagues’ study (1990), the encoding stage was conducted as an auditory task, as 
opposed to a visual task in other recall bias studies. This methodological difference 
may also have contributed to conflicting results. Finally, many of the chronic pain 
patients were depressed. The observed recall bias may have reflected the patients' 
depressed mood rather than their pain per se. Indeed, Edwards and colleagues 
(1992) demonstrated that depressed chronic pain patients had selective recall for 
sensory pain-related words and affective pain-related words, whilst non-depressed 
chronic pain patients showed selective recall for sensory pain-related words only.  
 
As in the original Pearce & Morley (1989) study, the pain-sensory and pain-affect 
contrast was adopted by two studies comparing arthritis patients and pain-free 
controls (Koutantji et al, 1999; Pincus et al, 1993). Both found a recall bias for 
sensory pain words when compared to pain affective and neutral words (self-
referent encoding) for the pain groups, however, Koutantji and colleagues (1999) 
found that sensory words were better recalled overall, irrespective of group. The 
authors suggest that this bias may be as a result of pain-sensory stimuli having a 
self-preservation role for all human beings. 
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Two studies examined an alternative contrast, investigating recall patterns with 
regard to pain/illness words (negative illness) and pain-free/healthy words 
(positive illness) in depressed and non-depressed arthritis patients (Clemmey & 
Nicassio, 1997; Pincus et al, 1995). For further comparison, one of the studies 
(Pincus et al, 1995) also included positive and negative depression words, and 
positive and negative control words. Results indicated that whilst depressed 
arthritis patients selectively endorsed and recalled self-referent negative illness 
stimuli, but not depression-related stimuli, no such bias existed in the non-
depressed arthritis patients. These findings are consistent with those of the other 
study, in which depressed and non-depressed RA patients were compared to 
depressed and non-depressed healthy controls (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997). 
Depressed RA patients exhibited endorsement and recall biases towards negative 
illness-related information, whilst non-depressed RA patients demonstrated the 
opposite bias towards positive illness-related information. No bias was detected in 
depressed and non-depressed controls for illness related information. The authors 
propose that their findings provide evidence for the presence of illness self-schema 
in RA patients. They argue that the illness schema is associated with mood 
disturbance, and its content is distinct from a depressive self-schema in healthy but 
depressed individuals. The results of these two studies are consistent with much of 
the selective attention literature, in which affective distress appears to be a 
mediating factor in the cognitive bias of pain patients to at least some types of 
pain-related stimuli. 
 
Illness Schema 
Despite being discussed as a hypothesised construct a number of years ago 
(Nerenz & Leventhal, 1983), the term ‘illness schema’ was only first used in the 
context of cognitive bias research in the aforementioned study by Clemmey & 
Nicassio (1997). Although other studies may have alluded to illness schema, it has 
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not been specifically mentioned. Subsequent to Clemmey & Nicassio’s (1997) 
paper, the term was not explicitly discussed until Pincus & Morley (2001) 
reviewed the cognitive bias literature and proposed a model for bias in pain 
patients. Thus, illness schema remains a relatively under-researched area. 
 
 
3a iii) Cognitive Bias for Pain Stimuli in Healthy Populations 
Cognitive biases for pain-related information have been studied in populations 
other than chronic illness and/or chronic pain. Keogh and colleagues (2001) 
conducted an attentional bias study in which healthy individuals were classified 
according to their fear of pain (high, medium or low). Participants completed a 
dot-probe task in which the experimental stimuli were pain sensory words, positive 
words, or words related to socially threatening situations. Each word category had 
a list of neutral words matched for frequency and length. Healthy individuals with 
a high fear of pain were found to demonstrate a clear attentional bias for pain 
sensory words relative to individuals with a low fear of pain. This bias was specific 
for pain material and was not found for social threat or control words. The 
importance of this finding is that if a pain-specific attentional bias exists in healthy 
individuals, the pain bias seen in chronic pain populations is not necessarily simply 
a product of chronic pain states.  
 
Koutantji and colleagues (2000) investigated memory and processing time biases 
for pain-related words in a group of otherwise healthy students with high or low 
frequencies of pain episodes. Relative to participants reporting a low number, 
students reporting a high number of pain episodes recalled significantly more pain-
sensory words and processed such words significantly faster. These findings 
indicate that pain-specific cognitive biases can develop alongside multiple, discrete 
pain episodes in the absence of either depressed mood or chronic pain. 
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3a iv) Cognitive Bias for Pain Stimuli: A Summary 
It is clear that no firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the specific nature of 
cognitive bias in pain patients. Direct comparison of studies is difficult due to 
differing methodologies and samples. Nevertheless, it can be said that selective 
attention and recall bias for sensory pain words appears to exist in at least a sub-
group of patients experiencing chronic pain. Although a small number of studies 
have found a cognitive bias in chronic pain patients as a whole group, the majority 
of studies have not. The relative contributions of the pain population (chronic pain 
versus chronic illness), depression, anxiety, fear of pain, and type of pain stimuli, 
are still somewhat unclear.  
 
Such complexity is not surprising, however, given the heterogeneity of patients 
with chronic pain and/or chronic illness. Cognitive bias has been most clearly 
established in populations where affective distress is the identifying feature (for 
example, in depressed or anxious populations; see Section 3a i)). In pain patients 
however, affective distress and overall level of functioning differs considerably 
from patient to patient and from illness to illness. If it were the combination of 
affective state and chronic pain that determined cognitive bias, such bias would not 
be apparent in every individual with chronic pain. A further consequence of the 
heterogeneity of the populations is that the personal relevance of pain stimuli will 
vary between individuals, depending upon the nature of their pain. Using the same 
pain words for groups of pain patients with different histories and different health 
problems may not reflect the personal schemas of each individual. Clearly, these 
are difficult issues to address in standardised studies, however, more research will 
indeed assist in untangling this complex area. 
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4. A MODEL FOR COGNITIVE BIAS IN CHRONIC 
PAIN/CHRONIC ILLNESS 
Despite the complexities, Pincus and Morley (2001) have recently reviewed the 
literature and have proposed a model to account for the various pain-related biases 
in patients with chronic pain and/or chronic illness. They suggest that each 
individual has a self-schema, one or more illness schemas, and a pain schema. The 
authors define the self and illness schemas similarly to those described previously 
(see Section 3), whilst the pain schema is defined as incorporating the sensory-
intensity, spatial, and temporal features of pain. Pincus & Morley (2001) 
acknowledge that pain and illness schemas are closely interrelated, yet argue that 
they should be considered independently for two main reasons. Firstly, some 
illnesses do not necessarily involve pain as a symptom (for example, diabetes), and 
secondly, some pain does not imply illness (for example, broken bones). This 
model is the first to differentiate illness schema from pain schema1.  
 
The authors propose that it is the interaction of three schemas-self, illness and 
pain-which accounts for the presence or absence of cognitive bias in pain patients. 
The schema enmeshment model asserts that when elements from illness and pain 
schemas are frequently activated at the same time as elements from one’s self-
schema, the content of the three schemas can become incorporated into one 
another, or enmeshed. Thus, the individual’s view of himself or herself is disrupted 
(see Figure 1). Pincus & Morley propose that it is the enmeshment of these 
schemas that underlies cognitive bias for sensory and affective pain stimuli. 
Depression, or affective distress, is offered as the primary mediating factor of the 
extent of the enmeshment, however, whether depression is the cause or 
consequence remains unknown.  
                                                          
1 It is noteworthy that this model, and hence the pain schema/illness schema distinction, was 
published after the current study had begun. 
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The schema enmeshment model predicts that pain patients who are depressed will 
show cognitive bias towards sensory and affective pain words (and potentially 
depressive words if the patient has a history of depression), whilst non-depressed 
pain patients will show a pain-sensory bias only. These two situations are 
represented by Figures 1C and 1B respectively. Pain-free individuals who are 
depressed will be biased towards depressive stimuli, whilst non-depressed pain-
free individuals will demonstrate cognitive bias towards neutral and/or positive 
stimuli. Both of these situations are represented by Figure 1A. The differing biases 
between depressed pain patients and depressed healthy individuals suggest that the 
nature of depression in pain patients is often distinct from depression in the 
absence of illness. This distinction has found support in studies by Pincus and 
colleagues (1995) and Clemmey & Nicassio (1997). 
 
 
 
Self 
     Self                                             Self 
 Pain                     Illness           Pain                Illness    Pain                 Illness 
A: Pain-free.             B: Coping with  C: Enmeshment 
Normal enmeshment           chronic pain   resulting in distress 
 
Figure 1: Schema enmeshment model of chronic pain. Adapted from Pincus & Morley (2001) 
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4a. The Pictorial Representation of Illness & 
Self Measure (PRISM) 
When examining Pincus & Morley’s graphical representation of the schema 
enmeshment model, a recently developed measure of the impact of illness comes to 
mind. Originally conceived as a possible summary measure of adjustment to 
illness, the Pictorial Representation of Illness and Self-Measure (PRISM) (Buchi et 
al, 1998) appears to be conceptually related to the schema enmeshment model. 
PRISM is a task in which "subjects are asked to imagine that a small board 
represents his/her life and a fixed disc on the board represents his/her 'self'. The 
task is to place another disc (illness) on the board to represent the current 
importance of illness in the patient's life." (Buchi et al, 1998; p222). The outcome 
measure is the distance between the centres of the two discs (see Figure 2). That is, 
PRISM measures the extent to which patients perceive their illness to be part of 
their sense of self. Conceptually, this is very similar to the schema enmeshment 
described by Pincus & Morley (2001). Naturally, a self-report instrument such as 
PRISM requires strategic processing, whereas the function of schemas and the 
resulting cognitive bias is automatic. Nevertheless, due to their superficial 
similarity, the relationship between so-called schema enmeshment and PRISM 
may prove to be interesting. 
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Buchi and colleagues (1998) investigated the utility of PRISM in a sample of RA 
patients, and found that the closer patients placed the illness disc to the self disc, 
the more pain, functional impairment and depression they experienced. In addition, 
PRISM distance was related to coping resources and perceived control over illness. 
Comparable results were found in a sample of SLE patients (Buchi et al, 2000). 
More detailed information about PRISM was gained from a validation study 
involving over 700 patients with a variety of physical illnesses (Buchi et al, 2002). 
From the results, the authors argue that PRISM is a potentially useful means of 
rapidly assessing what they term, “burden of suffering due to illness”, where a 
smaller distance between the illness and self discs indicates a greater burden of 
suffering for the individual. To a large extent this finding was derived from a 
qualitative component of the validation study, in which patients were asked to 
describe their reasons for their placement of the illness disk. However, without a 
quantitative measure of burden of suffering to function as a ‘gold standard’, it is 
difficult to establish the validity of PRISM as a measure of suffering.  
 
Although preliminary PRISM results are encouraging, it remains unclear as to 
precisely what PRISM is measuring. It is possible that PRISM merely provides a 
   Illness 
Self
Figure 2: The PRISM task 
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fairly crude indication of how significant an individual’s illness is to him or her. 
Furthermore, there are other measures (for example, quality of life or disability 
questionnaires) that seem to measure a similar concept. However, given the 
conceptual similarities between PRISM and the schema enmeshment model, it 
seems worthwhile to investigate the relationship between the two. It is possible 
that PRISM can provide an indication of the extent of enmeshment of self and 
illness schemas. It may be a valuable adjunct to other illness self-schema measures, 
which have typically relied on more complex and lengthy information processing 
paradigms. 
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5. IMPLICATIONS & UTILITY OF  
COGNITIVE BIAS IN PAIN 
If we were to understand the specifics of cognitive bias in chronically ill patients, 
in what way, and for whom, would that be beneficial? The basis for this answer 
resides in the application of cognitive therapy to pain patients. Cognitive theory 
states that it is an individual’s thoughts and interpretation of an event that influence 
mood and behaviour in response to that event (Beck et al, 1979). Cognitive therapy 
aims to modify unrealistically negative and dysfunctional thoughts in order to 
improve mood and behaviour. Schemas underlie automatic thoughts and influence 
thinking patterns and information processing. As discussed earlier, if patients (or a 
subset of) with chronic illnesses and/or chronic pain demonstrate cognitive bias for 
illness- and/or pain-related stimuli, this is argued to indicate the presence of 
negative illness-related schema or schema enmeshment.  
 
A greater understanding of the nature of cognitive bias and thinking patterns in 
pain patients has the potential to assist our understanding of underlying belief 
systems. It is well-established in cognitive therapy literature that such an 
understanding allows for more effective modification of dysfunctional thoughts 
and schemas. Such modification is likely to reduce affective distress and improve 
QOL. McCracken & Turk (2002) reviewed behavioural and cognitive-behavioural 
treatment (CBT) programs for chronic pain, and found them to be generally 
effective. They identified initial distress levels, beliefs about pain and illness, and 
self-efficacy as moderators of treatment outcome. In a review and meta-analysis of 
randomised controlled trials of CBT for chronic pain patients, Morley and 
colleagues (1999) also found this treatment to be effective. In the long-term, if 
cognitive bias knowledge was to assist clinicians in the administration of CBT, 
treatment outcome could be maximised. 
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6. SCHEMAS & COGNITIVE BIAS IN SLE 
To our knowledge, all but one of the studies to date that have investigated 
cognitive bias for pain stimuli have done so using chronic pain patients or arthritis 
patients (RA and osteoarthritis). The exception is a recent investigation of the 
impact of diagnosis on cognitive bias in patients with ankylosing spondylitis, an 
autoimmune disease causing severe, chronic back pain (Wells et al., 2003). This 
narrow focus is surprising given the numerous other chronic illnesses in which 
chronic pain is a significant symptom. One such illness is SLE. Various elements 
of illness have been implicated as contributing to cognitive bias in pain; repeated 
interruption of daily activities as a result of the illness, degradation of performance 
in comparison to desired standards, frustration, and unattained goals (Pincus & 
Morley, 2001; Nerenz & Leventhal, 1983). As all of these elements are present in 
SLE, it is reasonable to anticipate some evidence of cognitive bias in such patients. 
 
As discussed earlier, the literature on the cognitive, emotional and psychological 
sequelae of SLE is limited despite the substantial impact of the illness on the lives 
of its patients. The majority of the literature has focused on self-report measures 
and correlational analyses. For example, Baker & Wiginton (1997) interviewed 38 
women with SLE to explore their “commonsense representations” of their illness. 
In a related study, Wiginton (1999) utilised a cognitive mapping strategy to 
investigate how 20 women with SLE viewed their illness. The conclusion of both 
of these studies was that SLE is a complex illness and is represented differently by 
different patients. Whilst qualitative and quantitative research based on self-report 
methodologies is invaluable as a means of exploring the content of schemas, the 
methodological limitations associated with such research need to be considered. 
For example, questionnaires are susceptible to response bias, and can only 
investigate explicit cognitive structures at a strategic level of processing. A major 
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advantage of the information processing paradigm is that it allows researchers to 
gain access to levels of cognitive structure not accessible through self-report 
formats (Pincus & Morley, 2001). That is, information processing paradigms allow 
the function of underlying schemas to be identified. 
 
The investigation of cognitive bias in SLE patients may be all the more interesting 
as a result of the fluctuating course of the illness. As mentioned earlier, SLE 
patients typically experience periods of symptom exacerbation (flares) and of 
symptom improvement (non-flares) from the time of diagnosis. During non-flares 
patients can be virtually symptom-free with few interruptions to their daily routine. 
Surprisingly, the majority of SLE studies have not accounted for this flare/non-
flare demarcation (Dobkin et al, 1998; Denburg et al, 1997; Bauman et al, 1990). 
However, even during non-flares the continued threat of illness remains, as in most 
cases the symptoms of SLE will recur. This creates the situation where individuals 
with the same chronic illness can be tested, in which a proportion are in pain and 
ill, and the remainder are not in pain, are not overtly ‘ill’, but still live with the 
threat of ‘illness’. This is not the case in arthritis or chronic pain, where although 
symptom severity fluctuates, some symptoms are commonly present at all times. 
Thus, a ‘full remission’ cannot reliably be said to exist in these patients. 
 
Symptom severity has been found to not necessarily be associated with cognitive 
bias in pain patients (Pincus et al, 1995), however symptom absence or presence 
has not been investigated. Schemas are known to be dynamic structures, and are 
hypothesised to change and develop according to the accumulation of life 
experiences. They can also remain dormant for periods of time, and can then be 
activated by particular situations. It is plausible that such activation may occur 
with the onset of symptoms (change of status from non-flare to flare). Edwards and 
colleagues (1995) investigated cognitive bias in a small group of chronic pain 
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patients who were about to undergo surgery to ameliorate their pain complaint. 
Although the findings did not reach significance, there was a trend that chronic 
pain patients exhibited a bias for pain-related words, whilst recovered chronic pain 
patients (six months post-surgery) did not. This concept has been investigated in 
parallel circumstances by Bradley & Mathews (1988). They compared the memory 
biases of depressed patients to those who had recovered from depression in an 
effort to establish whether memory bias results from the depressed state itself, or 
from more persistent individual cognitive differences. The findings evidenced that 
depressed patients, but not controls or patients who had recovered, demonstrate a 
memory bias for negative self-referent material. Results consistent with this 
investigation have been found in numerous studies, for example, Dohr and 
colleagues (1989). These studies suggest that schemas are not static, but rather 
depend to some extent on current schema-related experiences.  
 
As discussed earlier, the schema enmeshment model proposes that it is depression 
that accounts for the activation of illness schema (or enmeshment of illness and 
self schemas) (Pincus & Morley, 2001). That is, schemas relating to illness are 
considered to be dynamic structures whose interaction and activation are 
influenced by the depressed mood of the patient. 
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7. THE PRESENT STUDY 
Due to their potential influence upon information processing and behaviour, a 
greater understanding of illness schemas in SLE may contribute to our knowledge 
of the adaptive and maladaptive ways in which patients attempt to deal with this 
illness. Such an understanding is particularly important in SLE due to the 
documented levels of distress experienced by patients with this illness. 
 
The present investigation seeks to examine illness schemas via cognitive biases in 
SLE patients. Due in part to the absence of any prior research in this area, two 
main hypotheses are proposed. The first relates to the disease status of the SLE 
patients, and will be referred to as the Flare Hypothesis. If illness schemas are 
activated by the re-emergence of disease symptoms, then dichotomising SLE 
patients according to flare status should result in a difference between groups, such 
that patients in a flare will demonstrate cognitive bias for illness words. The 
second hypothesis (Depression Hypothesis) arises from the evidence in other 
patient populations that depression is the mediating factor in cognitive bias. If 
illness schemas are invoked as part of a process through which ill individuals 
become depressed, then dividing the SLE patients according to depression status 
should result in a difference between the groups, where depressed patients 
demonstrate a bias but non-depressed patients do not.  
 
A clinical comparison group of RA patients is included in the present study. As 
RA has been the most common patient population that has been tested for 
cognitive bias, and RA and SLE are both autoimmune, rheumatological diseases, 
such a comparison was thought to be valuable in this investigation. For the 
purposes of the depression hypothesis the depressed SLE patients and the 
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depressed RA patients will be compared as a group (depressed ill) to the non-
depressed patients (non-depressed ill). A healthy control group is also included. 
 
In accordance with self-schema research under the information processing 
paradigm, the current study measures illness schema via endorsement and recall of 
positive and negative illness-related words. The methodology has its basis in the 
work of Pincus and colleagues (1995). Additional positive and negative control 
words are included in the information processing task in order to determine 
whether any affectively valenced bias is specifically related to illness-related 
words, or merely represents a bias in general (Pincus et al, 1995). Positive and 
negative depression-related words are also included in order to ascertain the nature 
of depressive schema in depressed, ill patients. In keeping with previous findings 
(Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997; Pincus et al, 1995), it is hypothesised that neither the 
patient groups (SLE/RA or depressed ill/non-depressed ill) nor the control group 
will exhibit a bias for the depression or control words. 
 
To complement the experimental paradigm, PRISM (Buchi et al, 1998) is also 
administered. It is predicted that the distance that patients place the ‘illness’ from 
the ‘self’ in the PRISM task will be inversely related to the degree to which 
patients demonstrate cognitive bias towards negative illness-related words. Support 
for this hypothesis would confirm the proposed relationship between the PRISM 
task and the concept of illness self-schema (or enmeshment of illness and self 
schemas). 
 
In addition to these primary aims and hypotheses, the current investigation aims to 
explore the relationships between illness self-schema, disease activity, and a 
number of other psychosocial aspects of SLE and RA. These will include 
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depression, quality of life, functional impairment, and illness perception. All of 
these constructs have been implicated in the psychological and physical well-being 
of rheumatology patients (Da Costa et al, 2000; Abu-Shakara et al, 1999; Denburg 
et al, 1997; Bauman et al, 1990), and will be measured via self-report instruments.  
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SECTION II:  
 
COGNITIVE BIAS IN SYSTEMIC LUPUS 
ERYTHEMATOSUS 
 
 
The following section is based on a manuscript prepared for publication: 
 
Denton, F., Sharpe, L. & Schrieber, L. Cognitive Bias in Systemic Lupus 
Erythematosus. European Journal of Pain (submitted).
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Evidence of cognitive bias in depression and anxiety has sparked an increasing 
interest in the potential for pain-related bias in patients suffering from chronic pain 
and/or illness. Cognitive biases are thought to arise from the activation of cognitive 
structures, or schemas, which function to organise and prioritise stimuli (Derry & 
Kuiper, 1981). Individuals possess a number of these schemas pertaining to 
various content domains, different combinations of which will be activated at 
different times. For example, depressed patients demonstrate memory bias for 
negative self-referent material (Mathews, 1997; Bradley & Mathews, 1988), and 
anxious patients show selective attention for anxiety-related stimuli (Keogh et al, 
2001; Williams et al, 1997). It makes intuitive sense that individuals who have 
endured pain or illness for an extended period of time may demonstrate 
pain/illness-congruent biases, thereby implicating the presence of active 
pain/illness schema.  
Results to date in this area have yielded somewhat conflicting results (see Pincus 
& Morley, 2001 for a comprehensive review). In the selective attention literature, 
one of the first studies to demonstrate pain bias found that, relative to pain-free 
controls, chronic pain patients showed selective attention for pain-affective words 
(e.g. ‘unbearable’) and pain-sensory words (e.g. ‘throbbing’) (Pearce & Morley, 
1989). In the only study to replicate this attention bias for all pain stimuli in 
chronic pain patients as a whole, Snider and colleagues (2000) only found a bias 
after controlling for depression. Other studies have only found attention biases in 
subgroups of pain patients categorised according to depression, anxiety and fear of 
pain (Keogh et al, 2001; Crombez et al, 2000; Pincus et al, 1998; Asmundson et al, 
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1997; Dehghani et al, submitted), or more specific biases according to the type of 
pain stimuli used (Crombez et al, 2000; Dehghani et al, submitted). 
 
In keeping with the findings from the selective attention literature, investigation of 
pain-related memory bias has implicated two main mediating variables: the nature 
of the pain stimuli used and the mood status of the pain patient. With reference to 
the former, all studies have found a recall bias for sensory pain words in pain 
patients as a whole (Koutantji et al, 1999; Pincus et al, 1993; Edwards et al, 1992; 
Pearce et al, 1990). Only two of these, however, employed a pain-free control 
group, one of which found a sensory pain bias irrespective of pain status (Koutantji 
et al, 1999). Recall bias for non-sensory pain words has generally only been 
demonstrated in depressed pain patients (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997; Pincus et al, 
1995; Edwards et al, 1992). This bias is relative to non-depressed pain patients, 
and depressed and non-depressed control groups (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997), 
and is specific for pain words (Pincus et al, 1995). Pincus & Morley (2001) argue 
that the results indicate that depression is the key determinant of pain-related bias 
in pain patients.  
 
The apparent complexity in this area is not entirely surprising, given the 
heterogeneity of patients with chronic pain and/or chronic illness. Cognitive bias 
was originally, and has been most clearly, established in populations where 
affective distress is the identifying feature (that is, in depression and anxiety). In 
pain patients, affective distress and overall level of functioning differs 
considerably from patient to patient and from illness to illness. If it were the 
combination of affective state and chronic pain that determines cognitive bias, 
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such bias would not be apparent in every individual with chronic pain. A further 
consequence of the heterogeneity of this population is that the personal relevance 
of pain stimuli will vary between individuals. Using the same pain words for 
groups of pain patients with different histories and different health problems may 
not reflect the personal schemas of each individual.  
 
All of the cognitive bias research in pain patients to date (save one study, Wells et 
al, 2003) has been conducted on just two patient populations: rheumatoid arthritis 
(and arthritis) and chronic pain2 patients. This narrow scope is somewhat 
surprising, given the numerous other conditions in which persisting pain is a 
significant symptom. One such condition is the autoimmune disease, systemic 
lupus erythematosus (SLE). Similar to rheumatoid arthritis (RA) in many ways, 
SLE is a chronic, autoimmune disease with no known aetiology or cure. SLE 
typically affects multiple organ systems such that they become inflamed and 
sometimes damaged. Common symptoms include extreme fatigue, arthralgia and 
joint pain, fever, anaemia, pleurisy, facial skin rash and hair loss. SLE is 
potentially life-threatening when it affects essential organs such as the heart, 
central nervous system or kidneys (McCracken et al, 1995). Diagnosis is often 
difficult, as many of the symptoms of SLE are similar to those of other illnesses 
and are often not present concurrently. Newly diagnosed patients have been 
experiencing symptoms such as extreme fatigue, weakness and frequent infections 
for an average of three years (Wallace, 1995). The disease tends to follow an 
                                                          
2 We use the term “chronic pain” to refer to physical pain that has been ongoing for a number of 
months in which physical explanations do not fully account for the reported severity (Birket-Smith, 
2001). Typically, this refers to individuals who have sustained an injury (for example, to their 
lower back), and the pain has continued despite the injury itself having healed. 
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unpredictable and chronic course with alternating exacerbations (flares) and 
remission of symptoms. 
 
It is partly because of this last characteristic of SLE (alternating flares and 
remissions) that the investigation of cognitive bias in SLE patients may be 
particularly interesting. During remission patients can be virtually symptom-free, 
however, the threat of illness remains as in most cases the symptoms of SLE will 
recur. This creates the situation where individuals with the same chronic illness 
can be tested in which a proportion are in pain and ill, and the remainder are not in 
pain, are not overtly ‘ill’, but still live with the threat of ‘illness’. This is not the 
case in arthritis or chronic pain, where although symptom severity fluctuates, some 
symptoms are commonly present at all times. Whilst symptom severity is not 
necessarily associated with cognitive bias in pain patients (Pincus et al, 1995), 
symptom absence or presence has not yet been investigated. Since we know that 
schemas are dynamic structures that can be dormant for periods of time and then 
activated by particular situations (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997; Markus, 1977), it is 
plausible that such activation may occur with the onset of symptoms (change of 
status from remission to flare). Evidence for this mechanism in terms of de-
activation has been found in comparisons of cognitive bias in chronic pain patients 
pre- and post-surgery (Edwards et al, 1995), and depressed patients compared with 
those who have recovered from depression (Bradley & Mathews, 1988; Dohr et al, 
1989). Alternatively, it may be the mood status of the patient that determines 
schema activation (and hence, cognitive bias), as Pincus & Morley (2001) have 
proposed. They argue that the evidence to date implicates depression as the 
determining factor of cognitive bias in pain patients. That is, regardless of the 
presence or absence of symptoms, those patients who are depressed will 
demonstrate bias for illness- and/or pain-related stimuli. 
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Thus, due to their potential influence upon information processing and behaviour, 
a greater understanding of illness schemas in SLE is likely to contribute to our 
knowledge of the adaptive and maladaptive ways in which patients attempt to deal 
with this condition. Such an understanding is particularly important in SLE due to 
the documented levels of distress experienced by patients with this illness (Katz et 
al, 2001; Iverson, 1995). Furthermore, the cognitive bias pain literature would 
benefit by broadening its focus beyond that of arthritis and chronic pain. 
 
The present investigation has two main aims: to investigate illness schemas in a 
previously neglected population of SLE patients, and to explore the nature of the 
schemas with regard to flare status and depression as described above. The present 
study aims to test two competing hypotheses related to cognitive biases. Firstly, if 
illness schemas are activated by the re-emergence of disease symptoms, then 
dichotomising SLE patients according to flare status should result in a difference 
between groups, such that patients in a flare will demonstrate cognitive bias for 
illness words (flare hypothesis). Alternatively, if illness schemas are invoked as 
part of a process through which ill individuals become depressed when living with 
illness or threat of illness, then dividing the patient groups according to depression 
status should result in a difference between the groups, where depressed patients 
demonstrate a bias in comparison to their non-depressed counterparts (depression 
hypothesis).  
 
A clinical comparison group of RA patients is included in the present study. As 
RA is the patient population that has been most commonly tested for cognitive 
bias, and RA and SLE are both autoimmune diseases, such a comparison was 
thought to be valuable in this investigation. For the purposes of the depression 
hypothesis the depressed SLE patients and the depressed RA patients will be 
compared as a group (depressed ill) to the non-depressed patients (non-depressed 
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ill). A healthy control group is also included. 
 
In accordance with self-schema research under the information processing 
paradigm, the current study measures illness schema via recall and endorsement of 
negative illness-related words relative to positive illness words. The methodology 
has its basis in the work of Pincus and colleagues (1995). Positive and negative 
depression-related words are included in order to ascertain the nature of depressive 
schema. Additional positive and negative control words are included to determine 
whether any affectively valenced bias is specifically related to illness-related 
words, or merely represents a bias in general (Pincus et al, 1995). In keeping with 
previous findings (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997; Pincus et al, 1995), it is 
hypothesised that neither the patient groups (SLE/RA or depressed ill/non-
depressed ill) nor the control group will exhibit a valence bias for the depression or 
control words. 
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2. METHOD 
 
2a. Participants 
The present study used a convenience sample. RA patients and approximately half 
of the SLE patients were recruited from the rheumatology department at Royal 
North Shore Hospital, Sydney. Eligible patients were informed of the study by 
their rheumatologist during their routine medical consultation, all of whom agreed 
to be contacted by the researcher for further information. Of these, four patients 
declined to proceed with participation.  
 
The remaining half of the SLE patients were recruited via advertisement in the 
newsletter of the NSW Lupus Association. Of those who expressed interest, 5 
patients decided not to participate. A letter confirming the diagnosis was sought 
from their treating rheumatologist. Patients over the age of 18 who fulfilled 
American College of Rheumatology (ACR) criteria for SLE or RA were eligible 
for inclusion in the study.  
 
Sixteen RA patients and 45 SLE patients agreed to participate in the study, after 
which two SLE patients were excluded due to their doctor being unable to confirm 
the diagnosis. For some analyses the SLE patients were further divided according 
to disease status, as measured by the Systemic Lupus Erythematosus Disease 
Activity Index (SLEDAI). The SLEDAI has been shown to be a valid measure of 
clinicians’ global assessment of disease activity in SLE (Bombardier et al, 1992). 
Patients rated at 6 or higher were considered to be in a flare (Gladman, 1995). 
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Twenty-two control participants were recruited via local advertisement. Exclusion 
criteria were non-fluent English or a history of chronic illness. Analysis revealed 
that there were no differences between SLE, RA or controls with regard to male to 
female ratio (p=0.275). SLE and control subjects were not significantly different in 
age (F<1), but RA patients were significantly older than the other two groups 
(F(2,78)=8.26, p<0.01). This reflects the increasing prevalence of RA with 
increasing age. An age-matched sample was likely to have been an unusual sample 
and not representative of the population of patients with RA. Pain levels, 
functional impairment, depression and anxiety were assessed in all participants 
(please see section 2f for a full description).  
 
2b. Procedure 
Two measures of cognitive bias were employed; an endorsement task followed by 
a free recall task. These two tasks were separated by an interference task, PRISM 
(see Section III). Memory was then tested by the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning 
Test (RAVLT), after which participants completed a series of self-report measures. 
The assessment took a total of 90 minutes. 
 
2c. Design 
2c. i) Flare Hypothesis 
A  4 x 3 x 2 x 2 design, with one between-group factor, illness (SLE flare, SLE 
non-flare, RA, healthy control): and three within-subject factors, word type 
(illness, depression, control), valence (positive and negative), and reference (self 
and other). The two dependent variables measuring self-schema were word 
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endorsement and word recall. 
 
2c. ii) Depression Hypothesis  
A  4 x 3 x 2 x 2 design, with one between-group factor, ill/depression (depressed 
ill, non-depressed ill, healthy control): and three within-subject factors, word type 
(illness, depression, control), valence (positive and negative), and reference (self 
and other). The two dependent variables measuring self-schema were word 
endorsement and word recall. 
 
 
 
2d. Cognitive Bias Measures 
 
2d. i) Endorsement Task  
 
This task was based on the methodology used by Pincus and colleagues (1995) and 
was presented to subjects on a portable laptop P.C. computer. Subjects were 
exposed to 72 stimulus trials, preceded by 10 practice trials. Each trial consisted of 
an adjective and a question being presented on the screen. Of the 72 adjectives, 24 
belonged to one of three content categories (illness, depression and control) of 
which 12 were positive and 12 were negative (see Table 2). For each adjective, 
subjects were asked in alternating order, "Describes you?" (self reference) or 
"Describes your best friend?" (other reference). The cue questions were followed 
by a gap of 500 milliseconds and the appearance of the target adjective. Subjects 
were required to respond by mouse-clicking on buttons on the screen marked 'Yes' 
or 'No', which were presented in a counter-balanced order from left to right. The 
response terminates the display, and the next cue question is presented 3.5 seconds 
later. The computer generated the random order for each subject such that no two 
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words from the same content category were presented in succession. The 72 
stimulus trials were then repeated such that subjects were presented with the 
opposite reference question for each adjective. Response time to each trial was 
recorded by the computer. The dependent variable was the number of words 
endorsed (response of ‘Yes’) in each stimulus category. 
 
Table 2: Stimuli used in the endorsement task 
 Self Reference Other Reference 
Control -ve Crude, discourteous, nosy,  
phoney, thoughtless, uncivil 
 
Disrespectful, immoral, obnoxious, 
rude, ungrateful, unprincipled 
Control +ve Congenial, polite, genuine,  
cooperative, scrupulous, tactful 
 
Amiable, cordial, ethical, honest, 
mannered, nice 
Depression -ve Inefficient, inadequate, lazy, 
boring, guilty, withdrawn 
 
Ineffective, insignificant, lowly, 
shameful, uninspired, unlikeable 
Depression +ve Lovable, motivated, outgoing, 
valuable, worthy, potent 
 
Ambitious, eager, praiseworthy, 
enthusiastic, attractive, pleasant 
Illness -ve Hurting, vulnerable, agonised, 
suffering, ill, uncomfortable 
 
Aching, dependent, sore, tortured, 
disabled, stiff 
Illness +ve Healthy, well, self-sufficient,  
active, healing, flexible 
Strong, lively, assertive, athletic, 
wholesome, comfortable 
 
 
2d. ii) Recall Task 
 
In the recall task, subjects were given a blank piece of paper by the experimenter 
and asked, "Please write down as many of the words as you can remember from 
the computer task you completed a few minutes ago". Order and spelling were de-
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emphasised. Subjects were given a maximum of five minutes to complete the task. 
The dependent variable was the proportion of words in each stimulus category that 
were recalled out of the total number of words recalled. 
 
2e. Cognitive Measure 
 
2e. i)  Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT) 
 
Due to the documented cognitive deficits in some SLE and RA patients (Denburg 
et al, 1997), and the fact that one of the primary dependent variables in the present 
study was recall, the Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT) was 
administered in order to control for learning and memory. The RAVLT has 
Australian norms (Geffen et al, 1990) and has been found to be a sensitive measure 
of cognitive involvement in patients with SLE (Kozora et al, 1996). 
 
2f. Self-Report Measures 
 
2f. i) Medical Outcomes Survey 36-Item Short Form Health 
Survey (SF-36) 
Functional impairment was measured using the SF-36 (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992), 
a widely used questionnaire for assessing issues related to quality of life in SLE 
(Stoll et al, 2001). The SF-36 is designed to measure physical and psychological 
functioning, and has been widely used as a health outcome measure in clinical 
trials in rheumatic diseases (for a review, see Molenaar et al, 2000). When 
compared to two other health measures, the SF-36 was found to be the most 
responsive to changes in perceived general health in arthritis patients (Husted et al, 
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1998). In a study of 150 SLE patients, Stoll and colleagues (1997) reported that the 
SF-36 has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.71) and good 
discriminatory validity. The Bodily Pain scale was used as a measure of pain. 
Whilst this scale is not a comprehensive assessment of pain levels, as pain is only 
one symptom of SLE and RA it was deemed satisfactory for the purposes of the 
present study. It was not feasible to independently assess each symptom of the two 
illnesses. 
 
2f. ii) Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
was used to assess depressive symptomatology for each subject. Research has 
demonstrated that depression is a significant factor in SLE (Klopchin, 2002; Da 
Costa et al, 1999), RA (Sharpe, 2001; Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997) and memory 
bias in self-schema (Pincus & Morley, 2001; Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997; Derry & 
Kuiper, 1981). The HADS was chosen for its minimal use of items based on 
somatic complaints, an important factor when sampling a population of chronically 
ill patients. In his comprehensive review of more than 200 published studies that 
have utilised the HADS, Herrmann (1997) reports good internal consistencies for 
both the anxiety and depression scales (Cronbach alphas between 0.8 and 0.93). 
Sensitivity and specificity of the scales are also good at 0.8 or higher. 
 
2g. Statistical Analysis 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the endorsement data and the 
recall data. In the cases where the data was not normally distributed, variances 
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were examined for homogeneity. In each case the largest variance was less than 
four times the smallest and so statistical analysis proceeded.  
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3. RESULTS 
The average time since diagnosis was 10 years for SLE patients and 13.4 years for 
RA patients, where the former were judged on average as having a moderate 
degree of disease activity (mean SLEDAI=5.96). All RA and SLE patients were 
taking some form of medication to control the disease. Both SLE and RA patients 
rated their physical impairment as high (mean SF-36 Physicalª=37; 31 
respectively), and their bodily pain as high (SF-36 Bodily Painª=41; 37 
respectively). These scores are below average relative to SF-36 norms for RA 
patients in general, indicating that this sample of rheumatology patients falls at the 
more severe end. Consistent with prior research, average anxiety and depression 
levels were mild to moderate in both SLE and RA patients. Surprisingly, short-
term memory in the two patient groups was not significantly below average (SLE 
RAVLT z-score= -0.046), (RA RAVLT z-score= -0.39). Healthy controls 
demonstrated significantly above average short-term memory (RAVLT z-
score=1.06; p<0.001). 
  
3a. Self-Report Measures 
Endorsement of self-referential negative illness words was significantly correlated 
with SF-Physical, SF-Mental, Pain Rating, HADS Depression and HADS Anxiety 
(all p<0.001). Endorsement of positive illness words was also correlated with these 
measures (in the opposite direction) (all p<0.001). Recall of illness words was not 
significantly related to any of self-report measures, whilst RAVLT z-score was 
highly correlated with total recall (r = 0.54, p<0.000). 
 
 
3b. Flare Hypothesis 
The characteristics of the four groups after SLE patients were divided according to 
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flare status are shown in Table 3. The control group significantly differed from the 
other three groups on all variables, and significant differences between the patient 
groups are marked with b. 
 
Table 3: Means (standard deviations) of demographics, disease and mood characteristics across 
flare groups 
 SLEnonflare SLE flare RA Controls 
N 17 26 16 22 
Male: Female 1:16 0:26 2:14 1:21 
Ageb 50.8 (9.7) 40.2 (12.1) 58.7 (11.8) 44.0 (13.8) 
Marital Status (% married)     
Years of Education      
Work Status (% working at 
least part-time) 
    
SLEDAIb 1.3 (1.8) 9.0 (4.2)   
Years since diagnosisb 14.1 (10.5) 7.4 (5.5) 13.4 (8.1)  
SF-36 Physicalª 37.1 (10.2) 37.0 (13.3) 31.5 (7.5) 55.2 (5.4) 
SF-36 Mentalªb 52.7 (7.6) 44.3 (10.5) 51.2 (9.6) 54.5 (6.9) 
Pain Ratingªb 44.5 (9.6) 39.6 (12.4) 36.3 (9.6) 54.3 (6.6) 
HADS Depressionb 4.0 (2.5) 5.7 (3.5) 7.0 (3.8) 1.6 (1.8) 
HADS Anxietyb 5.4 (2.2) 8.8 (2.8) 9.0 (4.5) 5.0 (2.0) 
RAVLT Z-score 0.27 -0.25 -0.39 1.06 
 
SLEDAI = Systemic Lupus Erythematosus Disease Activity Index 
HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
SF-36 = Short Form-36 Health Survey 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test 
ª Lower score indicates poorer functioning/more pain. General population mean=50 (s.d.=10) 
(Ware & Kosinski, 1994) 
bp<0.05 comparing patient groups 
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As a result of these significant differences between patient groups, the use of 
covariates was closely considered. Whilst higher pain ratings and SLEDAI scores 
in symptomatic patients are predicted and valid disparities, differences in anxiety, 
depression, general mental health, years since diagnosis and age have the potential 
to confound the results of any group comparisons on the variables of interest. 
Anxiety, depression and SF-Mental Health scores were highly correlated with each 
other (r>0.512, p<0.000), as were age and time since diagnosis (r=0.37, p=0.004). 
Due to these high intercorrelations, entering all variables as covariates is 
statistically problematic. Therefore, depression and age were initially both entered 
as covariates, however, as age did not alter the outcome it was removed. 
Depression is included as a covariate in all analyses for the flare hypothesis. 
  
3b. i) Endorsement 
 
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the number 
of words endorsed as descriptive. The four-way interaction between group, word 
type, valence and reference (4 x 3 x 2 x 2) was significant (F(3,76)=5.84, 
p=0.001). Two separate three-way repeated measure ANOVAs were conducted in 
each of the reference conditions, ‘self’ and ‘other’. The four groups did not differ 
from each other in the words they endorsed as describing their best friend 
(F(3,76)=0.29, p=0.83), however, the interaction was significant for the ‘self’ 
reference (F(3,76)=3.8, p=0.013). Accordingly, all further analyses were carried 
out on the endorsement scores in the condition of self-reference only. Within this 
condition there was no significant main effect for group (F(3,76)=0.83, p=0.48). A 
group by valence analysis in each word type domain revealed that groups differed 
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in their responses to illness words (F(3,76)=3.08, p=0.03), but not depression 
words (F(3,76)=1.6, p=0.21) or control words (F(3,76)=0.59, p=0.63). Post-hoc 
analyses using Bonferroni correction revealed that each of the patient groups 
endorsed more negative illness words and fewer positive illness words than healthy 
controls (SLEflare vs HC, p=0.006 (-ve), p=0.003 (+ve), SLEnonflare vs HC, 
p=0.000 (-ve), p=0.000 (+ve), RA vs HC, p=0.001 (-ve), p=0.000 (+ve)), but did 
not differ from each other (p >0.149). Means are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Means (and standard deviation) of number of words self endorsed across flare groups 
Word Type SLEnonflare SLEflare RA Controls 
0.53 (0.62) 0.50 (0.58) 0.63 (1.15) 0.36 (0.58) 
11.24 (0.66) 11.04 (1.11) 10.94 (1.18) 11.41 (0.73) 
0.76 (1.09) 1.50 (1.73) 2.06 (2.69) 0.95 (1.56) 
9.53 (1.91) 9.19 (2.42) 7.63 (3.48) 10.41 (2.11) 
4.47 (2.65) 6.42 (3.02) 6.63 (3.65) 1.45 (1.3) 
Control neg. 
Control pos. 
Depression neg. 
Depression pos. 
Illness neg. 
Illness pos. 7.29 (3.14) 7.19 (2.12) 7.00 (3.48) 10.27 (1.55) 
 
 
3b. ii) Recall 
 
As previous studies have found that words are more likely to be recalled if they 
have been endorsed in the encoding stage, correlations of endorsement and recall 
in each word category were calculated. No significant correlations were revealed 
in any of the word categories, thereby avoiding any concerns regarding the 
analysis of the recall data (r <0.16, p>0.17). 
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As there was such variation in the total number of words recalled (range 1-35), the 
dependent variable of choice was the proportion of total recall (Koutantji et al, 
1999; Calfas et al, 1997; Edwards et al, 1992). The three-way interaction between 
group, word type and valence (4 x 3 x 2) was not significant (F(3,76)= 0.91, 
p=0.44). There was a main effect for word type (F(1,76)=20.45, p<0.000) and 
valence (F(1,76)=8.04, p=0.006), indicating that all groups recalled more illness 
words and more positive words overall. Means are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Means (and standard deviation) of proportion of words recalled across flare groups 
Word Type SLEnonflare SLEflare RA Controls 
0.12 (0.12) 0.09 (0.08) 0.16 (0.10) 0.14 (0.10) 
0.12 (0.08) 0.17 (0.13) 0.16 (0.15) 0.19 (0.10) 
0.08 (0.07) 0.09 (0.08) 0.11 (0.16) 0.09 (0.09) 
0.21 (0.13) 0.20 (0.11) 0.23 (0.24) 0.18 (0.10) 
0.23 (0.30) 0.21 (0.10) 0.19 (0.13) 0.22 (0.10) 
Control neg. 
Control pos. 
Depression neg. 
Depression pos. 
Illness neg. 
Illness pos. 0.25 (0.14) 0.24 (0.10) 0.20 (0.11) 0.20 (0.10) 
 
 
4. Depression Hypothesis 
 
An insufficient number of SLE or RA patients scored above the cut-off point for 
depression to analyse the data separately for each illness group. Therefore, for the 
purposes of the depression hypothesis, all SLE and RA patients were combined 
and then re-divided according to depression status. Those with a score of 8 or 
higher on the HADS were classed as depressed (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). None 
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of the healthy control group were depressed and therefore that group remained the 
same. The characteristics of the three resultant groups are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Means (standard deviations) of disease and mood characteristics across depression groups 
 Ill-depressed Ill-non-depressed Controls 
N 18 41 22 
Male: Female 1:17 2:39 1:21 
Age 47.9 (15.4) 48.5 (13.0) 44.0 (13.8) 
SLEDAIb 8.5 (4.3) 6.1 (5.8)  
Years since diagnosis 9.0 (6.8) 11.8 (8.8)  
SF-36 Physicalªb 30.5 (10.7) 37.7 (10.8) 55.2 (5.4) 
SF-36 Mentalªb 39.8 (10.0) 52.4 (7.5) 54.5 (6.9) 
Pain Ratingªb 34.3 (12.6) 42.6 (9.6) 54.3 (6.6) 
HADS Depressionb 9.7 (2.2) 3.8 (2.1) 1.6 (1.8) 
HADS Anxietyb 10.7 (3.9) 6.7 (2.7) 5.0 (2.0) 
RAVLT Z-scorec -0.5 (1.4) 0.0 (1.3) 1.1 (1.0) 
 
SLEDAI = Systemic Lupus Erythematosus Disease Activity Index 
HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
SF-36 = Short Form-36 Health Survey 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test 
 ªLower score indicates poorer functioning/more pain. General population mean=50 (s.d.=10) (Ware & 
Kosinski, 1994) 
bPatient groups differed from each other and controls, p<.01  
cPatient groups did not differ from each other but differed from controls, p<0.01 
 
The statistical analyses conducted for the flare hypothesis were replicated for the 
depression hypothesis for word endorsement and word recall, except SF-36 
Physical scores were entered as a covariate in the endorsement analyses. This was 
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deemed necessary as a result of the differences between the patient groups on SF-
36 Physical, and the SF-36 Physical’s correlation with endorsement of negative 
illness words (r=-0.717, p<0.000). 
 
4a. Endorsement 
 
The four-way ANOVA between group, word type, valence and reference (3 x 3 x 2 
x 2) with SF-36 Physical as a covariate was significant (F(2,77)=3.813, p=0.026). 
As before, the groups only differed from each other in the words they endorsed as 
being self-descriptive (F(2,77)=5.618, p=0.005), therefore all further analyses were 
carried out on the self-reference endorsement scores only. There was no significant 
main effect for group (F(2,77)=0.95, p=0.39), but the interaction effect of group by 
valence (F(2,77)=11.155, p=0.00) was significant. Means are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Means (standard deviation) of number of words self endorsed across depression groups 
Word Type Ill-depressed Ill-non-depressed Controls 
0.94 (1.06) 0.37 (0.54) 0.36 (0.58) 
10.78 (1.17) 11.2 (0.93) 11.41 (0.73) 
2.72 (2.47) 0.88 (1.33) 0.95 (1.56) 
7.94 (3.1) 9.27 (2.43) 10.41 (2.11) 
7.89 (2.89) 5.05 (2.95) 1.45 (1.30) 
Control neg. 
Control pos. 
Depression neg. 
Depression pos. 
Illness neg. 
Illness pos. 5.17 (2.20) 8.05 (2.58) 10.27 (1.55) 
 
Post-hoc analyses, using Bonferroni adjustment, revealed that ill-depressed 
patients endorsed more negative illness words than ill-non-depressed patients 
(p=0.000), who endorsed more than controls (p=0.000). The reverse pattern existed 
for the positive illness words (ill-depressed vs HC, p=0.000, ill-depressed vs ill-
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nondepressed, p=0.001). Ill-depressed patients endorsed significantly fewer 
positive depression words than control subjects (p=0.008) although differences 
between ill depressed and non-depressed subjects failed to reach significance 
(p=0.2). Ill-depressed patients endorsed more negative depression words (vs HC, 
p=0.005; vs. ill-nondepressed, p=0.001) and more negative control words than 
either of the other groups (vs HC, p=0.031; vs. ill-nondepressed, p=0.013), who 
did not differ from each other (p=1). There were no significant differences between 
any of the groups in terms of positive control words (p>0.113). 
 
4b. Recall 
 
There was a main effect for word type (F(1,78)=26.6, p<0.000) and valence 
(F(1,78)=20.3, p<0.000), indicating that all groups recalled more illness words and 
positive words overall. The three-way interaction between group, word type and 
valence (3 x 3 x 2) was also significant (F(2,78)=3.13, p<0.05). However, post-hoc 
analyses revealed that the only difference between groups was due to the ill-
depressed group recalling fewer positive control words than the ill-non-depressed 
group (p = 0.019). Means are presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Means (and standard deviation) of proportion of words recalled across depression groups 
Word Type Ill-depressed Ill-non-depressed Controls 
0.093 (0.11) 0.115 (0.09) 0.138 (0.10) 
0.212 (0.17) 0.124 (0.08) 0.188 (0.09) 
0.099 (0.16) 0.086 (0.07) 0.086 (0.06) 
0.166 (0.14) 0.231 (0.16) 0.176 (0.10) 
0.223 (0.11) 0.203 (0.12) 0.216 (0.10) 
Control neg. 
Control pos. 
Depression neg. 
Depression pos. 
Illness neg. 
Illness pos. 0.207 (0.12) 0.241 (0.11) 0.198 (0.10) 
 
5. Post-Hoc Analyses 
 
In their recently-proposed model of cognitive bias in pain, Pincus & Morley (2001) 
were the first to suggest that pain schemas and illness schemas could be 
conceptualised separately. They propose that active pain schemas are reflected in 
cognitive bias for sensory pain stimuli (for example, 'throbbing', 'aching'), and that 
active illness schemas are reflected in cognitive bias for non-sensory pain stimuli, 
or pain affective and disability words (for example, 'dependent', 'suffering'). We 
examined the stimuli used in the current study, and found that ten of the twelve 
negative illness words could be divided into either sensory pain words or disability 
words. We performed post-hoc analyses on the self-referential endorsement and 
recall of these two types of words, firstly dividing the patients according to the 
flare hypothesis, and then according to the depression hypothesis. Covariates 
remained as before. 
 
ANOVAs were conducted for sensory and disability words with group as the 
between subjects factor. The dependent variable used was the proportion of the 
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total number of negative illness words recalled. Analyses revealed a difference in 
recall patterns only when participants were divided according to the depression 
hypothesis. For endorsement, there was main effect for group (F(2,78)=37.35, 
p=0.000) and a significant interaction effect (F(2,78)=3.62, p=0.03). Post-hoc 
comparisons, using Bonferroni adjustments, revealed that depressed patients 
endorsed more disability words than non-depressed patients (p=0.000), who 
endorsed more than controls (p=0.002). There was no significant difference 
between the two ill groups as to the number of sensory words endorsed (p=0.109). 
Similar results were found for the recall data. The main effect for group was not 
significant (F(2,78)=1.368, p=0.246), however, there was a significant interaction 
effect (F(2,78)=3.95, p=0.023). Ill-depressed patients recalled significantly more 
disability illness words relative to the non-depressed patients (p=0.01) and the 
control subjects (p=0.041), who did not differ from one another (p=1). There were 
no differences between the three groups for recall of sensory information (p>0.29) 
(see Figure 3). 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Sensory ill Disability ill
Word Type
Proportion of -ve 
illness words 
recalled
Controls
Ill-nondepres.
Ill-depres.
 
Figure 3: Mean sensory and disability words recalled as a proportion of total negative illness words 
recalled, across depression groups 
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4. DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to determine whether the presence of current 
symptomatology (the flare hypothesis) or depression (the depression hypothesis) 
better accounted for cognitive biases in chronically ill patients. The flare 
hypothesis did not receive support from either the recall data or the endorsement 
data. This suggests that symptomatology does not affect endorsement or recall of 
negative illness-related information.  On the other hand, the depression hypothesis 
was supported by the endorsement data but not the recall data. That is, when 
compared to non-depressed patients and healthy controls, depressed SLE/RA 
patients endorsed more negative illness words and fewer positive illness words, but 
did not differ in their recall of such words. However, when in post-hoc analyses 
words were divided as to whether they were related to pain or illness schema, 
differences in recall patterns did emerge that support the depression hypothesis. 
That is, depressed patients recalled and endorsed a significantly greater proportion 
of illness words related to disability than either of the other groups, whereas no 
differences were observed for sensory words.  
 
These results differ from those reported by Pincus and colleagues (1995) in their 
study of RA patients. Differences are unlikely to be due to methodological 
considerations, as the methodology for the present study was based on their work. 
It is possible that the discrepancy is due to inherent differences between SLE and 
RA patients. Firstly, SLE patients have been shown to have poorer cognitive 
functioning (and thus, memory) than the general population and poorer learning 
ability than RA patients (Kozora et al, 1996). Hence, the recall bias may have been 
less sensitive due to an overall floor effect. This explanation seems unlikely 
though, as there were no differences between the RA and SLE patients on the 
RAVLT. Yet as a full cognitive assessment was not conducted, this explanation 
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cannot be excluded. Secondly, it has been repeatedly proposed in the literature that 
depression in SLE is part of a neuropsychiatric presentation of the illness. It may 
be that for those SLE patients where the depressive symptomatology reflects an 
underlying disease process, self-schema has little relevance or relationship to the 
depression. For this reason, general group effects in SLE may be less reliable than 
in samples of RA patients. Again, the lack of difference between groups does not 
support this interpretation, but in the absence of any effort to determine the source 
of depressed mood, this interpretation cannot be excluded. 
 
In examining the comparison between our results and those of Pincus and 
colleagues (1995), it is noteworthy that of the eight published studies investigating 
pain-related recall biases in chronic pain/chronic illness, the majority have not 
found biases in a heterogenous group of patients towards heterogenous pain stimuli 
(Pincus & Morley, 2001). Rather, two studies found that only depressed pain 
patients demonstrated a recall bias for pain-related words (Clemmey & Nicassio, 
1997; Pincus et al, 1995). Other studies have demonstrated that non-depressed 
patients show bias towards sensory words in preference to illness or disability 
words (Wells et al, 2003; Koutantji et al.; 1999; Edwards et al., 1992; Dehghani et 
al., submitted). Another found that depressed pain patients show the opposite bias 
to this mainstream tendency, demonstrating cognitive bias for affective, disability 
or illness-related words (Edwards et al., 1992). It is this latter effect that was 
observed in the present study. 
 
Although in the present study patients as a whole recalled more illness words than 
words in other categories, this was also true of control participants. The presence 
of a bias towards pain-related information has been observed in other research, for 
example, a recent study by Wells and colleagues (2003). One explanation that they 
gave was the make-up of their control group, which was comprised of hospital 
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staff (who were exposed frequently to pain-related words and hence, this effect 
may be attributable to a frequency effect) or those attending for immunisations 
(whose pain schema may have been activated by the immunisation process). This 
explanation fails to account for the bias in the present study, as the control 
participants were university employees and students. They are therefore unlikely to 
have biases not evident in the general public as a result of their work or present 
circumstances. As has been suggested previously, a sensory bias may be adaptive 
and have evolutionary advantage, and it may not be specific to patients with 
chronic painful illnesses (Wells, et al, 2003; Koutantji et al., 1999). 
 
Consistent with the predictions of Pincus and Morley’s (2001) schema 
enmeshment model, we found that the level of depression accounted for the degree 
to which patients recalled disability-related words (illness self-schema) in 
preference to sensory pain-related words (pain self-schema). That is, depressed 
patients demonstrated a recall bias for disability words at the expense of sensory 
pain words, whereas the non-depressed patients and healthy controls recalled the 
two types of words equally. However, no differences were observed between the 
two patient groups on depression words. This again supports the view that 
depression in chronic illness is related to a different set of cognitive processes to 
those observed in depressed but healthy patients (Pincus & Morley, 2001). That is, 
patients whose illness schema are activated by their experience of chronic pain, are 
those who are at risk for poor adjustment to illness and hence depression.  
 
There are some limitations of the present study that must be borne in mind in 
interpreting the results. Firstly, convenience samples were used and therefore it is 
unclear the degree to which patients are representative of the population of patients 
with these illnesses. However, the levels of disability, illness duration, depression 
and age are similar to those reported in other studies of Lupus patients (Boomsma 
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et al, 2002; Buchi et al, 2000) and RA patients (Buchi et al, 2002; Gilboe et al, 
1998). Further, all groups were drawn through convenience sampling and are 
therefore likely to be subject to the same biases, making this an unlikely reason for 
the lack of differences. The samples were relatively small and although they were 
large enough to detect large effect sizes, smaller effect sizes may have been 
obscured, leading to Type II errors. This is particularly true when comparing flare 
and non-flare or depressed and non-depressed groups. Nonetheless, the sample 
sizes here are comparable to others reported in the literature (range n = 12 – 40).  
 
A further limitation worthy of note is the general severity of symptoms in the SLE 
group. Whilst they could be divided into flare and non-flare on the basis of 
SLEDAI scores, the mean SF-36 Physical score of each of the two groups reflected 
a relatively high level of symptomatology. Thus, it is unlikely that the ‘non-flare’ 
SLE group were in fact truly asymptomatic. This may have decreased the 
differences on the dependent variables between the two groups. Nonetheless, if 
symptomatology were the primary mechanism determining cognitive bias, one 
would expect to see at least a trend toward differences, which was not observed. In 
addition, as mentioned earlier the Bodily Pain scale of the SF-36 is not a 
comprehensive assessment of pain levels. Ideally the present study would have 
incorporated such an assessment. Finally, the effect of depression on responses to 
disability versus sensory words was based on post-hoc analyses. For these reasons 
these results should be interpreted with caution. 
 
These limitations aside, the present study is the first to extend the findings of the 
cognitive bias literature to an illness where patients differ markedly in their current 
symptoms. The results indicate that the level of symptomatology does not predict 
cognitive biases to illness-related words. The level of depression, on the other 
hand, was related to recall biases towards disability related words, but not sensory 
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pain words. These results suggest that an illness schema activated in some ill 
individuals may mediate the development of depression in individuals with chronic 
illnesses, such as SLE and RA. These results have potentially important clinical 
implications. The findings suggest that cognitive interventions that focus on 
changing unhelpful self-schema related to illness are likely to be helpful in 
reducing levels of depression amongst those ill individuals who are concurrently 
depressed.   
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SECTION III: 
PRISM: ENMESHMENT OF ILLNESS & SELF SCHEMA 
 
The following section is based on a manuscript prepared for publication: 
 
Denton, F., Sharpe, L. & Schrieber, L. PRISM: Enmeshment of Illness and Self-
Schema. Psychotherapy & Psychosomatics (in press). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Quality of life in chronic illness has become a widely researched area over the last 
two decades. In both the medical and psychological literature there has been a 
gradual shift away from relying only on laboratory and clinical indicators of 
disease, and a move towards measures that incorporate the patient’s perspective of 
their illness (Wood-Dauphinee, 1999). Such a shift has been necessitated by the 
growing body of evidence indicating that quality of life and disease variables often 
have little or no association with one another (Stoll et al, 2001; Gladman et al, 
1996). It cannot be assumed that the patient with severe illness has a poorer quality 
of life than the patient with milder illness. Numerous other psychological and 
emotional factors mediate patients’ experience of chronic illness, including 
patient-perceived impact of the disease (Edworthy et al, 1998; Burckhardt et al, 
1993), depression (Sharpe et al, 2001), learned helplessness (Thumboo et al, 
2000), and coping strategies (Da Costa et al, 1999; Dobkin et al, 1999). 
 
Buchi and colleagues (1998) have proposed that a key element of health status is 
the importance that an individual attaches to his/her illness in everyday life. In an 
attempt to measure this concept they developed the Pictorial Representation of 
Illness and Self Measure (PRISM). This novel graphic task requires the patient to 
position a disc representing their ‘illness’ in proximity to a disc representing their 
‘self’. The distance between the two disc centres is the main quantitative measure 
derived from the task.  
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Data from a validation study involving over 700 patients with a variety of physical 
illnesses (Buchi et al, 2002) indicated that the PRISM task is significantly 
correlated with a number of measures of physical and psychological function. 
However, the authors argue that PRISM measures a relatively specific notion that 
they term burden of suffering due to illness. According to their work, a smaller 
distance between the illness and self indicates a greater burden of suffering for the 
individual. To a large extent this finding was derived from a qualitative component 
of their study, in which patients were asked to describe their reasons for their 
placement of the illness disk. A qualitative methodology of this nature has the 
advantage of allowing investigators to understand the experience of illness for 
individuals and how this experience influences their responses. Such a 
methodology allows the generation of hypotheses that can be tested in subsequent 
larger quantitative studies. However, there are no reports of a quantitative measure 
of burden of suffering due to illness in the literature. Without such a quantitative 
measure to function as a ‘gold standard’, establishing the validity of PRISM as a 
measure of suffering remains difficult. Therefore, it is unclear at this stage as to 
whether PRISM represents burden of suffering as the authors suggest, or whether it 
is primarily related to other relevant concepts. One concept that is potentially 
relevant to this area is illness schema. 
 
Pincus and Morley (2001) have recently reviewed the literature on cognitive bias 
in chronic pain. They have proposed that the bias toward negative illness-related 
words observed in this population is a result of the enmeshment of three schemas 
representing pain, illness, and the self. They suggest that individuals hold sets of 
beliefs (or schemas) about themselves, their illness and their pain. According to 
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Pincus and Morley’s model, if elements from schemas related to illness and pain 
are frequently activated at the same time as elements from one’s self-schema, the 
content of the three schemas can become incorporated into one another, or 
enmeshed. Thus, the individual’s view of himself or herself is disrupted. 
Enmeshment of self and illness schemas is proposed to have an important role in 
the development of depression in the presence of chronic pain or illness (Pincus & 
Morley, 2001; Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997). 
 
Studies of cognitive bias represent a significant way in which researchers have 
been able to gain access to levels of cognition and cognitive processes that are 
generally inaccessible via standard interviews and questionnaires (Pincus & 
Morley, 2001). Cognitive bias (for example, attentional bias or memory bias) is 
hypothesised to indicate the presence of one or more schemas. Schemas represent 
the way that experiential knowledge has been articulated and differentiated in 
memory, and function to organise the processing, retention and retrieval of 
information (Derry & Kuiper, 1981). 
 
PRISM appears to be conceptually related to the schema enmeshment described by 
Pincus and Morley (2001), in that the task essentially requires patients to nominate 
how much their illness defines, or intrudes upon, their sense of self. In addition, 
given the relationship between schema enmeshment and depression, a relationship 
between enmeshment and PRISM (demonstrated to be related to burden of 
suffering) is likely.  
 
Thus, the present study seeks to investigate the relationship between the PRISM 
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task, and self and illness schemas, via measures of cognitive bias. It is 
hypothesised that the degree to which patients demonstrate a recall bias toward 
negative illness-related stimuli will be inversely related to the distance between the 
self and illness discs on the PRISM task. Systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) was 
the chosen chronic illness for this study, as patients with this disease were included 
in the original validation study of PRISM (Buchi et al, 2002). SLE is a chronic, 
autoimmune disease in which multiple organs become inflamed and sometimes 
damaged. Symptoms tend to follow an unpredictable course with alternating 
exacerbations (flares) and remissions. These symptoms include extreme fatigue, 
painful and/or swollen joints, skin rash and fever (McCracken et al, 1995).  
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2. METHOD 
2a. Sample3 
Participants were a convenience sample recruited from a rheumatology department 
at one Sydney hospital, and via advertisement in the regional Lupus Association’s 
newsletter. Patients over the age of 18 who fulfilled American College of 
Rheumatology (ACR) criteria for SLE according to their Rheumatologist were 
eligible for inclusion in the study. For participants who volunteered, a letter 
confirming their diagnosis was sought from the treating Rheumatologist. Forty-
five patients volunteered for the study and two were excluded because their 
Rheumatologist was unable to confirm an SLE diagnosis.  
 
2b. Measures 
2b. i) PRISM Task 
The method of administration of this task was identical to that outlined in the 
original publication of PRISM (Buchi et al, 1998), except that the present study 
used a computerised version. Subjects viewed a white computer screen with a 
fixed yellow disc (6cm in diameter) and two moveable discs, one red and one blue 
(4cm in diameter). Each subject was asked to imagine that the whole screen 
represents their life as it is currently, that the yellow disc represents their self, and 
that the red disc represents their illness. Each subject was then asked, "Where 
would you place the illness (red) disc in your life at the moment?". The subject 
was required to move the red disc by using a 'click and drag' movement with the 
computer mouse. The blue disk was available to illustrate the task with respect to 
                                                          
3 Identical sample as used in the previous study that is described in Section II. 
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work or family if the subject had difficulty understanding the task. The outcome 
measure was the distance in centimetres between the centres of the self and illness 
discs, termed Self Illness Separation (SIS). All participants were able to understand 
and complete the task. 
 
2b. ii) Endorsement Task  
This task was based on the methodology used by Pincus and colleagues (1995) and 
was presented to subjects on a portable laptop P.C. computer. Subjects were 
exposed to 72 experimental trials twice, preceded by 10 practice trials. Each trial 
consisted of an adjective and a question being presented on the screen. Of the 72 
adjectives, 24 belonged to one of three content categories (illness, depression and 
control) of which 12 were positive and 12 were negative. For each adjective, 
subjects were asked in alternating order, "Describes you?" or "Describes your best 
friend?". Subjects were required to respond by mouse-clicking on buttons on the 
screen marked 'Yes' or 'No', which were presented in a counter-balanced order 
from left to right. The computer generated the random order for each subject such 
that no two words from the same content category were presented in succession. 
For the purposes of this study, only data pertaining to self-referent (“Describes 
you?”) illness words are reported. A measure of endorsement bias was calculated 
by subtracting the number of negative illness words (e.g. disabled, aching) from 
the number of positive illness words (e.g. healthy, active) that were endorsed. 
 
2b. iii) Recall Task 
In the recall task, subjects were given a blank piece of paper by the experimenter 
and asked, "Please write down as many of the words as you can remember from 
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the computer task you completed a few minutes ago". Subjects were given a 
maximum of five minutes to complete the task. A measure of recall bias was 
calculated by subtracting the number of negative illness words from the number of 
positive illness words that were recalled (such that the lower the score the greater 
bias for negative words). It is this recall bias measure that is purported to assess 
schema (Pincus & Morley, 2001). 
 
2b. iv) Disease Activity 
Disease activity was assessed using the Systemic Lupus Erythematosus Disease 
Activity Index (SLEDAI), a valid measure of clinician’s global assessment of 
disease activity in SLE (Bombardier et al, 1992). The SLEDAI was completed by 
the treating Rheumatologist. 
 
2b. v) Impairment and Handicap 
Functional impairment was measured using the SF-36 (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992), 
a widely used questionnaire for assessing issues related to quality of life in SLE 
(Stoll et al, 2001).  
 
2b. vi) Depression 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
was used to assess depressive symptomatology for each subject. Research has 
demonstrated that depression is a significant factor in both SLE and memory bias 
in self-schema (Da Costa et al, 1999; Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997; Edwards et al, 
1992; Bradley & Mathews, 1988; Derry & Kuiper, 1981). The HADS was chosen 
for its minimal use of items based on somatic complaints, an important factor 
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when sampling a population of chronically ill patients. 
 
2b. vii) Illness Beliefs 
Subjects’ attributions and beliefs about SLE were assessed using the Illness 
Perception Questionnaire (Weinman et al, 1996). This measure assesses beliefs 
relating to control, consequences and causes of the specified illness. 
 
2b. viii) Cognitive 
Due to the documented cognitive deficits in some SLE patients (Denburg et al, 
1997), and the fact that one of the primary dependent variables in the present study 
was recall, the Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT) was administered in 
order to control for learning and memory. The RAVLT has Australian norms 
(Geffen at al, 1990) and has been found to be a sensitive measure of cognitive 
involvement in patients with SLE (Kozora et al, 1996). 
 
 
2c. Statistical Analysis 
Bivariate correlations with SIS were calculated using Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. A multiple regression analysis was then conducted with a subset of the 
variables that were significantly associated with SIS to investigate independent 
predictors of SIS. Although the risk of Type I errors increases with this number of 
correlations, as this analysis is primarily exploratory it is not necessary for it to be 
overly conservative. 
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3. RESULTS 
 
Of the 43 participants in the sample, 42 were female (98 %) and the mean age was 
44 years (range 22-70). Duration of illness was measured from the time of first 
diagnosis, and was on average a period of 10 years (range 1-42). Table 9 outlines 
characteristics of the sample. Aside from the female to male ratio in which men are 
under-represented, the characteristics of this sample are comparable to SLE 
outpatients in other studies (Buchi et al, 2000). 
 
Table 9: Characteristics of the study sample (n = 43) 
Age 44      (range 22-70) 
Female: Male ratio 42:1 
Duration of Illness (years) 10      (range 1-42) 
Disease Activity (SLEDAI) 6.8     (range 0-16) 
SF-36 Physical Component Scale 37.0   (12.03) 
SF-36 Mental Component Scale 47.8   (10.2) 
HADS; Depression subscale 5.05   (3.24) 
HADS; Anxiety subscale 7.4     (3.1) 
RAVLT-Total score 51.4   (7.9) 
IPQ Consequences 3.50   (0.7) 
IPQ Cure Control 3.48   (0.5) 
IPQ Timeline 4.08   (0.9) 
IPQ Identity 1.38   (0.4) 
 
* All values are means with standard deviations in brackets, unless stated otherwise. 
SLEDAI = Systemic Lupus Erythematosus Disease Activity Index 
SF-36 = Short Form 36 of Medical Outcomes Study 
HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
RAVLT = Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test 
IPQ = Illness Perception Questionnaire 
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The mean SIS was 6 cm with a standard deviation of 5 cm, and ranged from 0 cm 
to 21.4 cm. These data were transformed to make them comparable with the 
available range on the original manual version of PRISM (that is, 0-27cm). Our 
data are equivalent with a mean of 7.5cm, a standard deviation of 7.1 cm, and a 
range of 0-26.9 cm. SIS showed significant correlations with both endorsement 
bias (r = 0.34, p < 0.05) and recall bias of illness words (r = 0.37, p < 0.05), and 
IPQ Consequences subscale (r = -0.43, p < 0.01) (Table 10). The correlation 
between SIS and SF-36 physical component scale approached significance (r = 
0.29, p < 0.057).  
 
Table 10:  Correlations with Self Illness Separation (SIS)  
Recall bias of illness words  0.37* 
Endorsement bias of illness words  0.34* 
Age  0.00 
Duration of illness  0.06 
Disease Activity (SLEDAI) ― 0.04 
SF-36 Mental Component Scale   0.05 
SF-36 Physical Component Scale  0.29 
Depression (HADS subscale) ― 0.22 
Anxiety (HADS subscale) ― 0.18 
IPQ Consequences ― 0.43** 
IPQ Identity  0.07 
IPQ Timeline ― 0.09 
IPQ Cure control ― 0.20 
Memory and Learning (RAVLT)  0.01 
 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 Abbreviations as in Table 9 
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Variables were chosen for the multiple regression equation on the basis of their 
correlation with SIS (endorsement bias, recall bias, IPQ Consequences scale) or 
their theoretical interest (SF-36 PCS, HADS-Depression Scale).  The multiple 
regression equation significantly predicted the SIS score derived from PRISM 
(F(5,37) = 3.743, p < .01). However, of those variables entered into the multiple 
regression equation, only recall bias made an independent contribution to SIS 
(t(5,37) = 2.522, p < 0.05) (Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Multiple regression analysis of Self Illness Separation (SIS) 
 
 Beta T Significance 
Recall bias 0.367 2.522 0.016 
Endorsement bias 0.319 1.640 0.109 
HADS-Depression 0.026 0.147 0.884 
SF-36 Physical -0.062 -0.345 0.732 
IPQ Consequences -0.270 -1.762 0.086 
Adjusted r square 25%   
 
 
 
PRISM: Enmeshment of Illness & Self Schema 
 
81
4. DISCUSSION 
 
The results confirm the hypothesised relationship between the PRISM task and 
cognitive bias. The closer that SLE patients placed the ‘illness’ disk to the ‘self’ 
disk, the more negative illness words they recalled relative to positive illness 
words. Recall biases of this nature have been widely used to indicate the presence 
of schema (Pincus & Morley, 2001).  
 
The findings of this study are generally consistent with those of the SLE 
component of the PRISM validation study (Buchi et al, 2002). SIS was not 
correlated with disease activity, depression or SF-36 MCS in either study, whilst 
both studies found at least a near-significant correlation between SIS and SF-PCS. 
Three themes were identified in the qualitative validation study as contributing to 
an individual’s placement of the illness disk: intrusiveness, controllability, and 
interference with salient aspects of everyday living. This is consistent with the 
finding in the present study of a significant correlation of SIS with the IPQ 
Consequences subscale. This subscale addresses the extent to which an individual 
perceives that their illness has had far-reaching consequences upon their life. This 
concept is clearly related to the three features listed above. 
 
Buchi and colleagues’ (2002) interpretation of their findings leads them to the 
conclusion that PRISM is a measure of burden of suffering. Whilst their results are 
indeed consistent with what one might expect from a measure of suffering, we 
propose that this interpretation fails to encompass the full extent of the nature of 
PRISM.  
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Based on our findings, we propose that the PRISM task is assessing the 
enmeshment of an individual’s self and illness schemas, as suggested by Pincus 
and Morley’s model (2001). Pincus and Morley argue that in some patients with 
chronic pain and/or illness, their view of themselves becomes affected by their 
beliefs about the illness and pain. The more that their illness beliefs influence their 
self-schema, the more that their self and illness schema are said to become 
enmeshed. Pincus and Morley (2001) propose that the enmeshment of self and 
illness schemas is important in the disturbance to mood that commonly occurs in 
chronically ill patients. They suggest that cognitive bias for negative illness related 
information found in chronic pain patients measures the degree of schema 
enmeshment. The enmeshment described by Pincus and Morley appears to be 
similar to a notion outlined in the self-regulation model of illness (Nerenz & 
Leventhal, 1983). This model suggests that in some patients “the self is the 
disease, and the disease is the self” (p28). 
 
Buchi and colleagues (2002) argue that PRISM embodies a number of concepts 
that are central to suffering, namely Cassell’s notion of a threat to the individual 
self (Cassell, 1982), and a loss of meaning, purpose and autonomy. We suggest 
that such concepts are central to the enmeshment of illness and self schemas, as a 
result of which suffering ensues. Their comment that “resolution of suffering is 
said to depend on reformulation of the self” (Buchi et al, 2002; p16), is a near-
perfect description of the disentangling of the self and illness schemas that would 
be predicted to lead to a greater sense of autonomy and control. 
 
Schema enmeshment and suffering need not be mutually exclusive in terms of 
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what PRISM is measuring. Rather, we suggest that perceived burden of suffering 
is a manifestation of schema enmeshment. In this study, recall bias of illness words 
was the only significant predictor of where SLE patients placed the illness disc. 
This suggests that the observed cognitive bias is closely linked to the PRISM task. 
However, as we have not measured burden of suffering it is possible that this 
would also contribute to the variance in PRISM. 
 
It is important to note the limitations of this study. Firstly, the extent to which 
these results can be generalised to other chronic illnesses is unknown, as only 
patients with SLE were included in the present study. The sample of SLE patients 
in the PRISM validation study (Buchi et al, 2002) differed from the other illness 
groups, in that the relationship between depression and PRISM was non-
significant. Considering the established relationship between depression and 
cognitive bias (Pincus & Morley, 2001), it is unclear whether the relationships 
observed between negative illness self-schema and PRISM would be the same for 
other chronic illness samples. Further, participants were not a consecutive sample 
of patients and therefore may differ from the population of patients with SLE. 
Future research will be needed to investigate the generalisability of these results.  
 
Secondly, whilst the sample size in the present study is sufficiently large to detect 
medium to large effect sizes, smaller effect sizes may not reach significance. For 
example, the Consequences subscale of the IPQ approached significance as an 
independent predictor of PRISM (p = 0.086). In a larger sample, it is likely that 
this relationship would have reached significance. Despite the limitations to power 
observed in the present study, in comparison to the literature on cognitive biases, 
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this is a large sample. Sample sizes in the cognitive bias and chronic pain literature 
have relied on samples of between 12 and 40 participants (for a review, see Pincus 
& Morley, 2001). Hence, it is likely that the sample size is sufficient to detect 
clinically meaningful results.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of our study strongly support the 
view that PRISM measures the concept of self and illness schema enmeshment. 
This is a potentially important finding because schema enmeshment is thought to 
be an important process in adjustment to illness and hence, its measurement has 
great potential clinical utility. To date, studies that have purported to measure 
negative illness self-schema have done so using complex computerised programs 
that take over half an hour to administer. While such tasks are theoretically 
interesting, their clinical usefulness is limited because of their cost-inefficiency. 
Although PRISM was administered in this study by computer, the original task 
was developed as a manual task. The task can be easily adapted for routine clinical 
administration and takes less than five minutes to complete. More importantly, 
even in this sample of patients with SLE, many of whom had cognitive deficits 
associated with their illness, PRISM was easily understood by all participants. We 
believe that these results demonstrate that PRISM may be a useful tool to assess 
the enmeshment of self and illness schema, and potentially has wide clinical and 
research applicability. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The primary aim of this investigation was to explore illness self-schema in SLE via 
a cognitive bias paradigm. As no cognitive bias research has been conducted in 
SLE patients to date, two sets of hypotheses were proposed, partly generated on 
the basis of the biases that have been demonstrated in other patient populations. 
Firstly, it was suggested that the flare status of SLE patients may determine the 
cognitive bias (flare hypothesis), and secondly, that the determining factor is the 
presence of depression (depression hypothesis). 
 
The results provide partial support for the depression hypothesis, however the 
results are not clear-cut. It was predicted that depressed SLE and RA patients 
would demonstrate endorsement and recall bias for negative illness-related words 
relative to positive illness words, whilst non-depressed patients and healthy 
controls would not demonstrate such a bias. This prediction was in line with the 
findings of Pincus and colleagues (1995), whose study the present investigation 
was based upon. They found that depressed pain patients endorsed and recalled 
more negative pain4 words and fewer positive pain words than non-depressed pain 
patients and controls (who did not differ from each other), whilst all groups 
endorsed and recalled depression and control words similarly. Despite using a 
similar task and the same stimuli, the present investigation could not replicate 
these findings. Although depressed SLE/RA patients endorsed more negative 
illness words than the other two groups, they also endorsed more negative 
depression words and negative control words, indicating a non-specific negative 
bias. In terms of recall of illness, depression and control words (positive and 
negative), the groups did not differ from each other in any meaningful fashion.  
 
                                                          
4 Pincus and colleagues (1995) refer to the stimuli as 'pain' words whereas we have referred to them 
as 'illness' words. They are however, the same stimuli. 
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The most interesting results surfaced when the data was analysed in accordance 
with the structure of the schema enmeshment model, which distinguishes between 
pain-schema and illness-schema. Whilst no recall bias was found for negative 
illness words in general, when these stimuli were divided into sensory-pain and 
disability-related words the depressed patients demonstrated a clear bias for 
disability words. Non-depressed patients and healthy controls recalled the two 
types of words equally. So too with the patterns of endorsement; depressed patients 
endorsed significantly more disability words-but not sensory words-than non-
depressed patients. Thus, our results support the depression hypothesis that it is the 
presence of depression in SLE and RA patients that determines cognitive bias, 
however the nature of the bias was at variance with our initial expectations. 
 
Why then did we find different results to those found by Pincus and colleagues' 
(1995)? Clearly, the differences are unlikely to be due to methodological 
considerations as the present study replicated the endorsement and recall tasks and 
used the same stimuli. However, one way in which the current study differed 
methodologically from Pincus’ was in the use of PRISM as an interference task 
between the endorsement and recall sections of the cognitive bias task. It is 
possible that PRISM may have primed participants for the recall, given the illness 
component of the PRISM task. Whilst differences between groups is minimised 
because all participants completed the same series of tasks, this does represent a 
limitation of this study.  
 
As mentioned earlier the patient populations are indeed different, and this may be 
the source of the discrepancy. The cerebral aspect of SLE can be responsible for 
poor cognitive functioning and neuropsychiatric presentations such as depression, 
which may have made general cognitive bias effects in our SLE sample less 
reliable than in samples of RA patients. Our RAVLT results and the absence of 
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any differences between the RA and SLE patients do not support this explanation, 
however as this is the first cognitive bias study to include SLE patients we cannot 
rule it out. Further research is certainly required before any generalisations can be 
made. 
 
Thus, it is not entirely clear why our results differ from those found by Pincus and 
colleagues (1995). However, it is noteworthy that our results are not inconsistent 
with the literature in general. As mentioned earlier, the majority of published 
studies investigating recall biases in chronic pain have not found biases in a 
heterogenous group of pain patients towards heterogenous pain stimuli (Pincus & 
Morley, 2001). Rather, two studies found that only depressed pain patients 
demonstrated a recall bias for pain-related words (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997; 
Pincus et al, 1995). Other studies have demonstrated that non-depressed patients 
show bias towards sensory words in preference to illness or disability words 
(Wells et al, 2003; Koutantji et al.; 1999; Edwards et al., 1992; Dehghani et al., 
submitted). Another found that depressed pain patients show the opposite bias to 
this mainstream tendency, demonstrating cognitive bias for affective, disability or 
illness-related words (Edwards et al., 1992). It is this latter effect that was 
observed in the present study. 
 
Whilst Clemmey & Nicassio's (1997) study could be cited as one in support of 
Pincus and colleagues' (1995) results, on closer inspection the direct comparability 
of the results is unclear. The reason is that we cannot be certain of the stimuli that 
were used as the authors did not specify their words in the publication. They 
simply state that words "deemed to be health/illness relevant" were 
"generated…from dictionaries and a thesaurus" (p277) and validated in a pilot 
study. As a result, the reader is unable to ascertain the exact nature of the words 
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with regard to their ‘pain-sensory’ or ‘disability’ quality5. Recent developments in 
the literature - and indeed, our own results - identify that this distinction is likely to 
be a significant one in terms of the presence of cognitive bias. Clemmey & 
Nicassio (1997) state their aim as being to identify illness schema, and they refer to 
their stimuli as being illness-related. One might surmise, therefore, that at least a 
reasonable proportion of the words are likely to be disability-related. Thus, their 
results may in fact reflect a more specific bias than at first glance, and may be 
more consistent with the results of the current study than they appear.  
 
What is becoming increasingly apparent is that whilst our results are not clear-cut, 
neither is the literature. In many ways it appears that the results of Pincus and 
colleagues (1995) are the more unusual relative to the literature in general, yet can 
we discuss the ‘literature in general’ considering its ambiguity? It is the nature of 
the cognitive bias that is the complex issue to untangle. Whereas it has been 
established that some chronic pain/chronically ill patients demonstrate a processing 
bias for some stimuli related to pain and illness issues, the specific nature of that 
bias has not been established. Different studies have operationalised the concept of 
cognitive bias in different ways. Of those studies investigating recall bias (as 
opposed to attentional bias or interpretational bias), a different combination of 
stimuli has been used in each of them. For example, pain-sensory versus neutral 
versus general negative (Pearce et al, 1990), pain-sensory versus pain-affective 
versus neutral (Edwards et al, 1992), positive pain/illness versus negative 
pain/illness (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997; Pincus et al, 1995) to name a few. The 
differing types of stimuli is a source of variance over and above the use of different 
actual stimuli (that is, words). In addition, the choice for dependent variable is 
different in different studies. Whilst the majority have used the proportion of 
words recalled (Wells et al, 2003; Koutantji et al, 1999; Calfas et al, 1997; 
                                                          
5 We contacted the authors in an attempt to obtain a list of the stimuli, however we received no 
response. 
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Edwards et al, 1992), others have simply used the number of words recalled 
(Pincus et al, 1995; Pearce et al, 1990), and one study only considered recalled 
words that had been endorsed (Clemmey & Nicassio, 1997). These numerous 
sources of methodological variability are likely to contribute substantially to the 
apparent inconsistencies within the literature. 
 
One consequence of the confusion as to how to operationalise cognitive bias, is 
uncertainty as to the precise relationship between cognitive bias and schema. Both 
Pincus and colleagues (1995) and Clemmey & Nicassio (1997) assert that 
endorsement bias and recall bias reflect self-schema. In both of these studies the 
endorsement data show the same bias as the recall data, and are therefore 
interpreted to be measuring the same construct. The present study, however, found 
the ill depressed patients demonstrated an endorsement bias for negative illness 
words, but not a recall bias. Furthermore, endorsement and recall of each word 
type were not correlated as they have been in numerous other studies (Calfas et al, 
1997; Pincus et al, 1995). These results suggest that endorsement and recall are not 
necessarily one and the same as measures of self-schema. In their most recent 
investigation, Wells and colleagues (2003) appear to be in agreement with such a 
suggestion. Once again they utilise the endorsement and recall methodology, but 
for this study they only report the recall data. This suggests that they perceive the 
recall data as being a more relevant cognitive bias measure, whilst the endorsement 
of stimuli serves as a means of encoding. 
 
This issue relates back to the nature of schema, hypothesised to consist of both 
content and function (Derry & Kuiper, 1981). Just as questionnaires are thought to 
measure schema content, it appears reasonable that endorsement of words as being 
self-descriptive would also reflect schema content. It is recall bias (or attention 
bias or interpretation bias) that represents the schema's function. One possible 
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explanation for finding endorsement bias but not recall bias relates to the 
crudeness of the methodology employed. Endorsement on a 'yes' or 'no' basis is not 
a realistic representation of the structure of beliefs, which are inherently non-
dichotomous in nature. Some individuals may endorse stimuli when their strength 
of belief is weak, and some may endorse only when their strength of belief is 
almost 100%. If the majority of individuals adopt the former approach the results 
may indeed indicate an endorsement bias, however it may reflect a weak schema 
that is not sufficiently pervasive to affect patterns of recall. The use of a Likert 
scale during the endorsement stage is one way in which this issue could be 
addressed. Such an approach would more accurately reflect the nature of beliefs, as 
individuals would have the opportunity to endorse stimuli on a continuum. Future 
research is required in order to empirically investigate the utility of such a 
methodology, and whether or not the strength of endorsement is related to recall 
bias. 
 
Whilst we may not be certain of the nature of the relationship between 
endorsement and recall bias, it is clear that they both relate to self-schema in some 
way. A secondary aim of the current study of SLE patients was to investigate the 
relationship between such supposed measures of self-schema, and PRISM, a 
recently-developed measure of suffering (Buchi et al, 1998). Our results indicate 
that PRISM may indeed be measuring schema-related issues in addition to 
reflecting the burden of suffering due to illness. A multiple regression analysis 
clearly demonstrates that recall bias for negative illness words makes an 
independent and significant contribution to PRISM distance. [The fact that 
endorsement bias did not make an independent contribution provides further 
evidence that endorsement bias and recall bias are not one and the same.] As 
discussed earlier, these results are interpreted as providing preliminary evidence 
that the PRISM task may reflect the enmeshment of illness and self-schemas, as 
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outlined in the schema enmeshment model of chronic pain (Pincus & Morley, 
2001). 
 
When conducting these PRISM analyses the issue of which cognitive bias measure 
to use surfaced once again. At this stage it is worth reiterating the point that the 
distinction between pain schema and illness schema was not made in the literature 
until after the design of the present study. The initial intention was to use the 
negative/positive bias of illness-related words (assumed to reflect illness self-
schema), however the unexpected findings of the primary investigation (Section II) 
forced a re-evaluation of the situation. After careful consideration it was decided to 
continue as planned, and use the difference between the proportion of positive and 
negative illness words recalled as a single dependent variable. This choice was 
made primarily as a result of the investigation being exploratory and the first of its 
kind. Firstly, no cognitive bias study has been conducted in SLE patients, and 
secondly, the PRISM task has not been explored in relation to any cognitive bias 
measure in any population. Therefore, it was considered most appropriate for the 
initial investigation to not be limited by overly specific hypotheses regarding sub-
types of pain and illness words6. Furthermore, the inclusion of all illness words 
accounted for the possibility that PRISM represents the enmeshment of illness and 
self schemas, pain and self schemas, or both. Certainly, future research would 
benefit from investigating this relationship further. If the PRISM task can be 
demonstrated to robustly reflect patients' illness or pain schemas, it would be an 
                                                          
6 For interest's sake, post-hoc analyses were conducted on the PRISM data with the SLE and RA 
patients grouped as per the depression hypothesis (ill-non-depressed versus ill-depressed). Ill-
depressed patients placed the illness and self discs significantly closer together than did the ill-non-
depressed (p<0.05). When RA patients were included in a post-hoc replication of the regression 
analysis, the contribution of recall bias remained the only significant predictor of PRISM distance. 
Recall of sensory and disability words were not significantly related to PRISM. 
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invaluable, quick and easy tool to assess schema and hence provide a greater 
understanding of how a patient is affected by his/her pain or illness. 
 
One finding of the present study that is entirely in keeping with the literature is the 
lack of support for what we termed the flare hypothesis. There is has been an 
accumulation of evidence indicating that disease severity has little effect on quality 
of life, depression and schema-related issues (Persson & Sahlberg, 2002; Stoll et  
al, 2001; Wang et al, 2001; Wood-Dauphinee, 1999). Our results provide evidence 
for a similar effect in SLE patients. As mentioned earlier, the SF-36 scores of our 
SLE-nonflare sample do suggest that they were not entirely asymptomatic, thereby 
raising the query of whether our flare/nonflare comparison was justifiable. 
Nonetheless, if disease severity and/or symptomatology was indeed the 
determining factor for cognitive bias, at the very least a hint of a distinction should 
have been evident. No such hint was evident in the data. 
 
As opposed to symptomatology determining cognitive bias, our results are more 
indicative of the specificity of stimuli being important, with particular regard to the 
sensory-pain or disability-related component of negative illness words. 
Furthermore, the presence of depression appears to play a role in either the 
activation of illness schemas or the enmeshment of them with the self-schema. 
Unfortunately the small sample size of our ill-depressed group (n=18) does 
represent a limitation of the study, as it reduced the power of detecting the 
positive-negative bias that Pincus and colleagues (1995) found. The patterns of 
recall bias for negative illness words were in the expected direction (see Table 8), 
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but failed to reach significance. This may suggest that the bias is occurring, but 
only in a subgroup of the stimuli (for example, disability versus sensory words). 
Our effect size was calculated as being moderate and requiring a sample size of 64 
to become statistically significant. Once again it is clear that further research is 
required, using larger sample sizes and more consistent stimuli, to determine the 
true effect. 
 
In summary, it appears as though the present investigation raises more questions 
than it answers. As discussed however, this is in keeping with the literature relating 
to recall bias in patients with chronic pain and/or chronic illness. When one 
considers the additional factor that the present study investigated the relatively rare 
and under-researched illness of SLE, it is not surprising that few firm conclusions 
can be drawn at this early stage. The results of this study need to be regarded 
cautiously, as the sample sizes are relatively small and the most interesting 
findings are based on post-hoc analyses. Naturally, as the majority of the 
participants were patients with SLE, the extent to which our findings can be 
generalised to other patient populations is unknown. Nevertheless, it was a major 
aim of this investigation to explore the nature of cognitive bias and illness schema 
in SLE in particular. Further research is required to ascertain how representative 
our results are of this illness in general. SLE has largely been neglected within 
much of the psychological literature, despite being a potentially debilitating 
disease with far-reaching consequences for the quality of life of its sufferers. A 
greater understanding of the belief structures and patterns of cognitive processing 
of SLE patients-and indeed, patients with any chronic illness or chronic pain issue-
will inform the way in which we aim to improve their quality of life. Until pain 
General Discussion 
 
95
and illness are cured, the ultimate goal for psychologists remains to develop 
effective treatments that minimise the negative effect of chronic illness upon 
people's lives. 
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